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Abstract 
This contribution discusses legal and methodological problems of multilevel governance of the 
international trading, development, environmental and legal systems from the perspective of “public 
goods theories” and related legal theories. The state-centred, power-oriented governance practices in 
worldwide organizations fail to protect effectively human rights, transnational rule of law and other 
international public goods for the benefit of citizens. Their criticism by civil society, democratic 
parliaments and courts of justice prompts increasing opposition to non-inclusive, intergovernmental 
rule-making, as in the case of the 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement rejected by the European 
Parliament. The “democracy deficits” and morally often unjustified power politics underlying 
“Westphalian intergovernmentalism” weaken the overall coherence of multilevel regulation of 
interdependent public goods that interact “horizontally” (e.g., the monetary, trading, development, 
environmental and related legal systems) as well as “vertically” (e.g., in case of “aggregate public 
goods” composed of local, national, regional and worldwide public goods). The “laboratory” of 
European multilevel governance offers lessons for reforming worldwide governance institutions 
dominated by executives. The integration of nation states into an interdependent, globalized world 
requires a multilevel integration law in order to protect transnational public goods more effectively. 
Legal and constitutional theories need to be integrated into public goods research and must promote 
stronger legal, judicial and democratic accountability of intergovernmental rule-making vis-à-vis 
citizens on the basis of “cosmopolitan constitutionalism” evaluating the legitimacy of national legal 
systems also in terms of their contribution to protecting cosmopolitan rights and transnational public 
goods. 
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 1 
CONSTITUTING, LIMITING, REGULATING AND JUSTIFYING MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF 
INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS:  
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
*
 
I. Introduction: Methodological and Legitimacy Problems of Multilevel Governance 
This contribution argues that the universal recognition of “inalienable” human rights by all UN 
member states requires a “cosmopolitan paradigm change” in interpreting and developing international 
law in the 21st century so that citizens can conceive themselves not only as addressees but also as 
authors of international law and protect their national and international public goods more effectively. 
Human rights require justification of all legal and governance systems vis-à-vis citizens as democratic 
“principals” of all governance powers and co-authors of legitimate law-making; in the 21st century, 
also state sovereignty and state consent to international rules are legitimate only to the extent that they 
recognize citizens as free and equal subjects of human rights and “agents of justice” on the basis of 
general and reciprocal reasons and constitutional safeguards that interpret state sovereignty in 
conformity with popular and “individual sovereignty” as protected by human rights.1 This 
“emancipatory function” of human rights to challenge and change historically power-oriented 
structures of legal systems has not yet been realized in the law of most worldwide organizations like 
the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The prevailing “Westphalian 
model” of international law and UN institutions remains characterized by power-oriented, 
intergovernmental claims 
 to limit international law to rights and obligations of states without regard to the democratic 
legitimacy of governments in UN member states and to the necessary protection of human rights 
and popular self-determination against abuses of power and of “state sovereignty”; 
 to focus on “national interests” as defined by national interest groups rather than on protection of 
human rights and general consumer welfare that are not mentioned in most worldwide economic 
and environmental agreements; 
 to separate national and international legal systems and exclude legal and judicial remedies of 
citizens against welfare-reducing violations of international treaty obligations; and 
 to treat citizens as mere objects of international law—without democratic justification of the 
welfare-reducing under-supply of international public goods (like protection of human rights, 
transnational rule of law, democratic self-government, efficient trading and environmental 
systems) and of the unnecessary poverty of more than 1 billion people living on one dollar or 
less per day. 
                                                     
* 
Emeritus Professor of International and European Law, European University Institute (EUI), Florence, Italy; chairman of 
the International Trade Law Committee of the International Law Association and legal consultant for the World Trade 
Organization. This contribution has been accepted for publication in the Global Community Yearbook of International 
Law and Jurisprudence (GCYILJ) 2012 (2013).
 
1
 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS (2012), chapters II and III. “General” refers to reasons 
that can be supported by all human beings in view of their common interests in human rights; “reciprocity” of reasons 
excludes claims (e.g., of paternalism) that do not concede the same rights and principles to all other human beings; see 
RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION. ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE (2012). 
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Most UN member states do not even attempt to justify UN law and WTO law in terms of protecting 
human rights and general consumer welfare. The denial by governments of legal and judicial 
accountability vis-à-vis citizens for the intergovernmental failures to protect international public goods 
does not serve reasonable interests of citizens. The UN Charter, UN human rights conventions and 
many other international treaties (like the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)) 
explicitly recognize that human rights are “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”; 
“respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law” requires 
settlement of international disputes “in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,” 
including human rights and universal fundamental freedoms (Article 1 UN Charter, Preamble VCLT). 
Yet, most international economic and environmental treaties neither refer to human rights and 
“principles of justice” nor succeed in realizing their declared treaty objectives—like “sustainable 
development”—for the benefit of citizens. Likewise, international economic and environmental 
dispute settlements outside Europe only rarely refer to human rights; in interpreting human and 
democratic autonomy (e.g., economic freedoms and property rights) and related responsibilities, 
international economic and environmental courts often fail to adequately take into account the diverse 
“contexts of justice” protected by human rights (e.g., the different dimensions of human autonomy 
rights) such as: 
 private freedoms of citizens (e.g., freedoms of the Internet) to define and develop one’s 
individual identity in private communities with due respect for the legitimate diversity of 
individual and social conceptions of a “good life”; 
 moral freedoms of all members of global humanity (e.g., to respect for, and protection of, 
“inalienable” and “indivisible” human rights and other moral “principles of justice”) in their 
relationships with other human beings inside and beyond states; 
 legal freedoms of citizens to equal treatment and participation in legal communities, including 
“negative freedoms” from unjustified government restrictions and “positive freedoms” of 
participation and development of one’s human capacities; 
 political freedoms of citizens to participate as co-authors of democratic legislation in the 
democratic exercise of national governance powers; 
 cosmopolitan freedoms of citizens (e.g., in their roles as producers, investors, traders and 
consumers cooperating in the global division of labour) to be recognized and legally protected as 
“world citizens” in national and international law in order to be able to exercise their collective 
responsibility for jointly supplying transnational public goods, including entitlement “to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized” (Article 28 Universal Declaration of Human Rights).2 
The often “feudal domination” of international law and institutions by power-oriented governments 
insisting on foreign policy discretion to violate international rules in exchange for political support 
from rent-seeking interest groups (e.g., agricultural, textiles and steel lobbies in national parliaments) 
undermines the effectiveness of international legal systems to protect international public goods, for 
instance by de-legitimizing international rules and excluding rights of citizens to invoke and enforce 
international rules in domestic or international “courts of justice.” The more UN law and WTO law 
fail to protect human rights and other cosmopolitan freedoms without democratic justification of 
welfare-reducing governance failures to protect interdependent public goods, the less citizens have 
                                                     
2
 The different private, legal and political “contexts of justice” in particular communities, and of moral and cosmopolitan 
principles in the world community of human beings, have been recognized in human rights declarations since the 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789; see PETERSMANN, supra note 1, and RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS 
OF JUSTICE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM (2002). On the inadequate “judicial 
methodologies” in international trade and investment adjudication, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Judicial Task of 
Administering Justice in Trade and Investment Law and Adjudication, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Vol. 4 (2013) No.1. 
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reasons to accept and support power-oriented “Westphalian international law” treating citizens as mere 
objects rather than subjects and “democratic owners” of international law and institutions. The main 
thesis of this contribution is that human rights law (HRL) requires stronger protection not only of 
private, legal and democratic autonomy rights and responsibilities in national legal systems, but also of 
cosmopolitan rights in modern international law and institutions in order to protect interdependent, 
national and international public goods more effectively. 
A. Governance Challenges of International Public Goods 
In contrast to private goods that are spontaneously produced, financed and distributed in private 
markets and communities, the production and financing of public goods—whose consumption (e.g., in 
case of “intermediate public goods” like human rights and rule of law) is, by definition, open to all 
(“non-excludable”) and does not reduce their availability to others (“non-rivalrous”)—entails 
additional governance challenges in order to limit “free riding” and other “collective action” problems. 
Globalization continues to transform ever more local and national “public goods” traditionally 
supplied by states into international “aggregate public goods” requiring new forms of multilevel 
governance, regulation and justification. The more these new private and public governance spheres 
(e.g., of globally integrated financial markets) lack adequate regulation and provoke systemic crises, 
the more citizens, civil society and the newly emerging “transnational communities” (e.g., of citizens 
cooperating in the global division of labour and in protecting the environment) criticize the obvious 
governance failures to protect public goods like “financial stability,” a liberal world trading system, 
prevention of climate change, and the human rights obligations of all UN member states. The world 
financial crises since 2008, the European debt crises since 2010, the failures of the Doha Round and 
climate change negotiations, and the unnecessary poverty of more than 2 billion people living on two 
dollars or less per day are “public bads” illustrating systemic failures of the prevailing “Westphalian 
model” of intergovernmental regulation of “aggregate public goods” (e.g., transnational “composite 
goods” like the world trading system composed of vertically and horizontally interconnected, national, 
regional and worldwide public goods). As first explained by Immanuel Kant’s  “cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism,” the legitimacy of intergovernmental rule-making cannot be adequately ensured 
through national democratic procedures alone; in the 21st century, the legitimacy of transnational legal 
systems needs to be evaluated also in terms of their contribution to protecting cosmopolitan rights and 
transnational public goods demanded by citizens rather than only in terms of national constitutions 
that depend ever more on international law and institutions as legal preconditions for protecting 
international public goods.
3
 In a globalizing world, international law and institutions for the collective 
supply of transnational public goods require constitutional safeguards of human rights no less than 
national law and institutions for the supply of national public goods. 
B. Legitimacy Deficits of “Westphalian Path-Dependence” 
The UN and its specialized agencies continue to be based on the principle of “sovereign equality of 
states” and fail to effectively limit power-oriented “Westphalian conceptions” of “international law 
among sovereign states” (i.e., focusing on effective control by governments over a population in a 
limited territory) by constitutional protection of human rights and democratic governance. The more 
the dynamically evolving UN HRL requires all UN member states to respect, protect and fulfil 
“inalienable” human rights, the more citizens, civil society and “people” no longer perceive state-
consent to international rules as a sufficient justification of international law and of the under-supply 
of international public goods demanded by citizens. The treatment of citizens as mere objects rather 
                                                     
3
 On Kantian “multilevel cosmopolitan constitutionalism” and the need for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional 
democracies also in terms of their use of international law for protecting human rights and other international public 
goods for the benefit of citizens, see PETERSMANN, supra note 1, chapters II and III. 
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than subjects of international law and “democratic owners” of all governance institutions leads to 
increasing criticism that the inadequate “output legitimacy” of UN law focusing on rights and 
obligations of states and of their often authoritarian rulers is due to its insufficient “democratic input 
legitimacy” resulting from the domination of foreign policy powers by executives and from their 
frequent neglect for cosmopolitan rights, democratic governance, judicial remedies and other 
“principles of justice” necessary for justifying law and governance in the 21st century. 
Also inside the European Union (EU), the increasing “euro-scepticism” reflects distrust by citizens 
vis-à-vis multilevel governance of public goods distorted by persistent violations by most EU member 
governments of rule of law (e.g., of the agreed budget, debt and economic convergence disciplines in 
the Lisbon Treaty) and by injustices caused by interest group politics (e.g., due to under-regulation of 
financial markets, government bailouts of private industries in exchange for political support). Better 
regulation of interrelated public goods requires more adequate theories, rules and institutions for 
providing, maintaining and financing interdependent local, national, regional and global public goods. 
The agreed policy objective of “sustainable development,” for instance, calls for reconciling not only 
economic, environmental, social and human rights objectives; multilevel governance must also remain 
democratically justifiable vis-à-vis domestic citizens and avoid imposing harmful externalities on 
future generations (e.g., in terms of public debt, environmental harms). As the under-supply of 
international public goods affects the welfare of people in all UN member states, authoritarian 
governments (e.g., in many less-developed countries) and the “Westphalian traditions” of 
intergovernmental regulation in UN institutions are increasingly challenged by civil societies and 
circumvented by recourse to sub-optimal regional, plurilateral, bilateral or unilateral policy 
alternatives (like regional trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, regional carbon-emission 
trading systems, humanitarian interventions based on “duties to protect” agreed “common concerns”). 
Regional HRL, economic integration law and international investment law and adjudication challenge 
the methodological premises of “Westphalian intergovernmentalism” by justifying law and 
governance in terms of constitutional and cosmopolitan rights and judicial remedies in order to limit 
and improve governance institutions for collective supply of international public goods. Yet, even 
inside the EU, it remains deeply contested to what extent democratic control at national levels and 
democratic representation of EU citizens and national peoples in EU institutions need to be 
supplemented by “cosmopolitan democracy” based on sovereignty of citizens rather than of their 
nation states.
4
 Also EU institutions increasingly insist on “freedom of manoeuvre”5—in the sense of 
freedom to violate WTO law, UN conventions and other international legal obligations of the EU 
ratified by national parliaments—without legal and judicial accountability vis-à-vis EU citizens 
adversely affected by such violations of the EU’s constitutional commitment to “strict observance of 
international law” (Article 3 TEU).6 
                                                     
4
 On competing models of national and cosmopolitan “democracy from below” and a multinational, federal EU democracy 
whose decision-making and legislation can be directly legitimated at the EU level, see RETHINKING DEMOCRACY AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Erik Oddvar Eriksen & John Erik Fossum eds., 2011). 
5
 This term continues to be used by both the political EU institutions and the EU Court of Justice (e.g., in Joined cases C-120 
and C-121/06 P, FIAMM, 2008 ECR I-6513, para. 119) as the main justification for their disregard of legally binding 
WTO rules and WTO dispute settlement rulings. 
6
 For an overview of the case-law of the EU Court of Justice denying EU citizens rights to invoke and enforce WTO 
obligations in national and European courts and request compensation for injury caused by persistent violations of the 
EU’s WTO obligations, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Can the EU’s Disregard for “Strict Observance of International 
Law” (Article 3 TEU) Be Constitutionally Justified?, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR J. BOURGEOIS 214 (M. Bronckers, V. 
Hauspiel & R. Quick eds., 2011). 
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C. Need for Comparative Legal-Institutional Analyses of Multilevel Governance 
Section II of this contribution begins with a brief overview of why two of the most successful 
international organizations for the collective supply of international public goods—i.e., the WTO and 
the EU—are currently facing severe “multilevel governance failures.” Section III identifies additional 
collective action problems impeding collective supply of interdependent public goods from the 
perspective of economic, political and legal theories and analyses. Section IV discusses case-studies of 
multilevel governance of “interface problems” of the international trading, environmental, 
development and related legal systems; by comparing the legal regulation of diverse, international 
“aggregate public goods,” lessons can be drawn for more efficient, legitimate and effective 
governance of interrelated public goods and for institutional alternatives. These comparative analyses 
are based on more than 20 case-studies of multilevel governance of international public goods 
presented and discussed at two international conferences at the European University Institute (EUI) at 
Florence in February and October 2011.
7
 There is broad agreement today that “the provision of global 
public goods occurs largely without the benefit of relevant, up-to-date theory. Public goods research 
often lags behind the rapidly evolving political and economic realities—marked by a state-centric and 
national focus and, consequently, providing poor support for advice on the provision of global public 
goods in today’s multiactor world.”8 Apart from noting that the international law principle of 
“sovereign equality of states” prevents coercing “free-riding states” into cooperating in the supply of 
international public goods, the existing research has neglected legal theory
9
 as well as the common 
principles underlying the hundreds of multilateral agreements accepted by UN member states for 
protecting international public goods. Global public goods theories and “Westphalian legal practices” 
prevailing in worldwide organizations also neglect “legal methodology,” for instance because foreign 
policies remain dominated by “realist,” i.e., state-centred and power-oriented approaches challenging 
legal interpretations if they arrive at different conclusions based on different “legal methodologies.” 
The term legal methodology is used here for the respective conceptions of the sources and “rules of 
recognition” of law, the methods of interpretation, the functions and systemic nature of legal systems, 
and of their relationships to other areas of law and politics. Even though the “inalienable” human 
rights obligations of all UN member states are founded on “normative individualism” and require 
justifying modern international law in terms of human rights, the legislative and executive 
“governance modes” and “judicial methodologies” applied by most worldwide institutions continue 
focusing on rights and obligations of the rulers without effectively limiting their often non-inclusive, 
intergovernmental procedures by cosmopolitan rights and other constitutional and judicial restraints. 
Also the WTO and the EU—i.e., the two most developed, multilevel legal and compulsory dispute 
settlement systems for governing the international trading system—are increasingly confronted with 
national governance failures undermining international public goods like a liberal (i.e., liberty-based) 
world trading and stable financial system protecting consumer welfare and transnational rule of law 
for the benefit of citizens. For instance, the private and public debt crises and economic crises in the 
                                                     
7
 Twelve of these case-studies are published in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Interdependent 
Public Goods. Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21st Century (RSCAS 2012/13, 
Global Governance Programme Working Paper, 2012). Seven additional case-studies have been published in the 23 Eur. 
J. Int’l L. (2012), 643-791. 
8
 Providing Global Public Goods. Managing Globalization (Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le Goulven, & Ronald U. 
Mendoza eds., 2003), at 5. 
9
 The two leading research publications on global public goods published by the UN Development Program—i.e., Global 
Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc Stern eds., 1999) as 
well as Kaul et al. (supra note 8)—did not include legal studies. The book edited by Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. 
Reichman, International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime 
(2005), focused on knowledge as “perhaps the quintessential public good” (at 47) and on its decentralized supply by 
means of intellectual property rights excluding “free riders” and setting incentives for innovation. 
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EU are closely related to the fact that 23 out of 27 EU member states no longer comply with the fiscal 
and debt disciplines agreed upon in the Lisbon Treaty. 
D. HRL Requires Reviewing Legal Methodologies of Global Governance 
Sections V and VI conclude by exploring constitutional, legal and methodological problems of 
multilevel governance of citizen-driven “aggregate public goods.” Multilevel governance and public 
goods theories must be made more legitimate by strengthening deliberative and participatory 
democracy based on constitutional theories of justice giving citizens, civil society, parliaments and 
courts of justice more incentives for holding governments legally, judicially and democratically 
accountable. As only citizens and people—but not states—have moral and human rights, the 
democratic legitimacy of international law depends on its approval by individuals, people and their 
democratic representatives and on its “human rights coherence”; incentives for cooperation in 
collective supply of international public goods must be strengthened through stronger cosmopolitan 
rights, judicial remedies and “constitutional limitations” of “state sovereignty” by “duties to protect” 
international public goods beyond state borders based on modern HRL and related concepts of 
“responsible sovereignty.” For instance, HRL may justify 
 cosmopolitan economic and social rights for holding governments more accountable for failures 
to protect international public goods, as illustrated by the judgment of the German Constitutional 
Court of 18 July 2012 recognizing a fundamental right of asylum seekers and other foreign 
migrants in Germany to receive higher cash benefits for their “dignified minimum existence” 
protected by their human right to dignity (Article 1, Sec. 1 of the German Basic Law) in 
conjunction with the constitutional guarantee of a social welfare state (Article 20, Sec. 1);
10
 
 additional rights of “access to justice,” to justification and judicial review of governmental 
restrictions, as illustrated by guarantees of judicial remedies in regional HRL, in the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (Article 47) and international economic law (IEL);
11
 
 “duties to protect common concerns,” corresponding judicial remedies (e.g., pursuant to Article 
VIII:2(b) International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement concerning the non-enforceability of 
exchange contracts violating IMF rules), and sanctions vis-à-vis gross human rights violations by 
dictatorial governments or “free-riding countries” refusing to participate in the joint reduction of 
environmental harms;
12
 
 the transformation of public goods into “club goods” excluding “free riders” (like countries 
unwilling to accept the legal disciplines of WTO law or regional free trade agreements); 
 and the granting of public or private property rights in “common pool resources” (like deep 
seabed minerals, fishery resources) so as to prevent the “tragedy of the commons.” 
E. HRL Calls for “Cosmopolitan Reforms” of Multilevel Governance of Public Goods 
HRL calls for empowerment of citizens by cosmopolitan rights and other constitutional limits of the 
pervasive governance failures to protect public goods like an efficient world trading system based on 
transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. Human rights and recognition of “common 
concerns” (like public health and environmental protection) may justify decentralized “private-public 
                                                     
10
 Judgment, July 18, 2012 (1 BvL 10/10, 1 BvL 2/11). 
11
 Examples include Article 8 UDHR, Article 13 ECHR, Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 3 and 7 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, Articles 8 and 25 Inter-American Charter of Human Rights; see ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007). 
12
 An example is the unilateral extension of environmental protection measures to polluters from third countries as discussed 
by Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the Application of the EU’s Emission Trading System to Aviation, 23 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 429 (2012). 
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partnerships” of citizens and governments at national and international levels so as to reinforce 
incentives for promoting public goods through more accountable modes of co-operation in conformity 
with the “subsidiarity principle.” As illustrated by recognition of human rights to governmental 
protection of public goods (like rule of law), by “privatization” of the supply of public goods (like 
access to water), or by the close co-operation of many UN Specialized Agencies like the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their collective supply of 
public goods (like public health, protection of labour rights, governance of the Internet), the 
“publicness” and “privateness” of many goods are socially and legally constructed rather than innate 
properties. Also HRL is based on respect for private and public autonomy protecting diverse 
conceptions of individual, communitarian and democratic self-determination. HRL requires justifying 
intergovernmental restrictions and reviewing the “rules of recognition” of public international law 
(e.g., as codified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) in order to better 
reconcile the private and public law dimensions of IEL and of other areas of multilevel governance of 
interdependent public goods. Cosmopolitan constitutionalism argues for more coherent regulation of 
the “horizontal” and “vertical” interdependencies between the national and international components 
of the international trading, environmental, development and related legal systems based on more 
coherent conceptions of “transnational rule of law” for the benefit of citizens and stronger respect for 
cosmopolitan rights in transnational economic, social and legal cooperation. 
In order to be supported by citizens, civil society and by national parliaments, the necessary legal and 
institutional adjustments of multilevel governance to the regulatory needs of globalization in the 21st 
century require new forms of democratic and legal justification. At the national level of constitutional 
democracies, the dual justification of the democratic legitimacy of law and governance in terms of 
human rights (e.g., protecting individual dignity, autonomy and responsibility) and democratic supply 
of public goods (e.g., through parliamentary, participatory and deliberative democracy based on rule 
of law) must take into account that ever more “aggregate public goods” can no longer be secured 
unilaterally and depend on international co-operation based on international law and institutions. At 
the transnational level of multilevel governance beyond states, the traditional forms of justifying 
international rules and institutions through parliamentary ratification no longer suffice in view of the 
fact that most national parliaments no longer effectively control the thousands of international 
agreements and hundreds of international institutions dominated by government executives. The 
exercise of legislative, administrative and judicial powers by international organizations for the 
collective supply of international public goods requires additional democratic justification and 
multilevel control. Even though globalization entails new transnational communities (e.g., of 
producers, investors, traders and consumers cooperating in the global division of labour), democratic 
people remain constituted and limited by national constitutions, even inside the EU. Arguably, the 
absence of transnational “peoples,” the inadequacy of parliamentary control of multilevel governance 
and the “legal pluralism” of private and public, transnational legal regimes require new forms of 
democratic legitimization beyond national populism by means of “cosmopolitan constitutionalism” 
focusing on cosmopolitan rights, participatory and deliberative “bottom up democracy” beyond state 
borders and stronger “constitutional checks and balances” limiting harmful “externalities” of national 
governance failures in order to protect international public goods. The reality and normative 
legitimacy of “constitutional pluralism” at national and international levels reflects “reasonable 
disagreement” among citizens and democratic governments and must remain respected, as illustrated 
by “deferential interpretations” of “public interest exceptions” in multilateral economic regulation 
(like Article XX GATT) aimed at coordinating competing public goods with due respect for national 
“margins of appreciation” and democratic disagreements on how to define and protect “principles of 
justice.”13 
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II. Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods: “Governance Failures” in 
the World Trading and Financial System 
The thousands of worldwide, regional, national, public and private organizations for the governance of 
international monetary, trade, development and environmental relations differ enormously. At the 
global level of UN and WTO law, civil society and political leaders increasingly criticize “the gap 
between theory and practice” in analysing and regulating global governance. 
A. The Gap between “Theory” and Practice” in Global Governance 
In the words of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, the prevailing “Westphalian conceptions” of 
“international law among sovereign states” and of intergovernmental rule-making postulate that “as 
States are coherent and legitimate, global governance is necessarily coherent and legitimate as well.”14 
In international practice, however, “States are often incoherent”; also “member-driven international 
organizations” may lack legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. The “legal bridges” built between 
international organizations in order to remedy the “coherence gap” are often weak. As “theory and 
practice do not match,” WTO Director-General Lamy calls for “pragmatic solutions . . . to be found 
now to enhance global governance and better address the problems that our world is facing,” notably 
by providing better leadership, more legitimacy, efficient results for the benefit of people at a 
reasonable cost, and more policy coherence. At the national level, leadership, legitimacy and 
efficiency are within the same hands of one “government”; at the international level, however, the 
three elements are much more complex. European integration has evolved into a unique multilevel 
governance model based on leadership by the independent European Commission and legitimacy 
promoted by democratic and judicial EU institutions protecting European public goods like the 
common market. But the declining participation in elections of the European Parliament and the rising 
euro-scepticism in public opinion reveal the limits of legitimacy also of the EU. Lamy supports the 
emerging “triangle of coherence” based on (1) the Group of 20 systemically most important developed 
and emerging economies G20 providing political leadership and policy direction; (2) the UN 
providing a framework for global legitimacy through accountability; and (3) member-driven 
international organizations providing expertise and specialized regulation, whose mutual coherence is 
being promoted by the increasing “bridges” linking the G20 to the UN and to specialized 
organizations like the WTO. Lamy also endorses the attempts at revitalizing the ECOSOC in order to 
enhance UN system-wide coherence, the increasing number of joint initiatives by the WTO and UN 
agencies, as well as the readjustment of voting rights in the Bretton Woods institutions. But the 
“secondary legitimacy” deriving from state democracy must be reinforced by more “primary 
legitimacy” deriving from direct participation of citizens. Hence, global governance must respond to 
the democratic criticism of “too-distant, non-accountable and non-directly challengeable decision-
making at the international level.” Another lesson from European experience is the need for basing 
successful integration on common objectives, shared values and adequate institutions. According to 
Lamy, the UN human rights values and regional integration are “the essential intermediate step 
between the national and the global governance level” and need to be strengthened before stronger 
local and “community support” for multilevel governance institutions may emerge. More “primary 
legitimacy” of global governance based on support from civil society and “global citizens”—
supporting a “global community” and the necessary building of a new “polity”—requires “localizing 
global problems” and remains “the main political challenge we are facing.” 
(Contd.)                                                                  
deliberative democracy in European economic integration, see Armin von Bogdandy, The European Lesson for 
International Democracy: The Significance of Articles 9–12 EU Treaty for International Organizations, 23 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 315 (2012). 
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 WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, Global Governance: From Theory to Practice, in Petersmann, supra note 7, at 25–
30. The following quotations in the text are from this speech by Lamy. 
Constituting, Limiting, Regulating and Justifying Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods 
9 
B. Politicization of Global and Regional Governance of Public Goods 
Most global governance institutions, like the UN specialized agencies and the WTO, are dominated by 
government executives and administrative “experts” searching for “technically right” solutions to 
international regulatory problems (e.g., of monetary, health and climate change policies, “risk 
assessment procedures”) and avoiding democratic politics and parliamentary control. European 
governance institutions like the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA) among 30 member countries, 
the Council of Europe and its European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) among 47 European 
countries are limited to democratic member states willing to submit their multilevel governance to 
multilevel constitutional restraints like human rights and multilevel legislative, parliamentary, judicial 
and other civil society institutions. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, 
the problems of constitutionalizing multilevel economic governance have intensified also inside the 
EU, for example due to the transfer of additional commercial policy powers to the European 
Parliament and the persistent violations of the agreed fiscal and debt disciplines by 23 out of 27 EU 
member states. European politicians like Josep Borrell (a former member of the Spanish government 
and former president of the European Parliament as well as of the EUI) emphasize the need for 
additional forms of “multilevel democratic governance,” even if the “politicization” of the EU’s 
common trade and environmental negotiations resulting from the co-decision powers of the European 
Parliament risks augmenting also the “capabilities-expectations gap” in EU foreign policies as well as 
the risks of “regulatory capture” by vested interests.15 The diverse democratic preferences and 
national, regional and worldwide governance structures explain the diversity of responses to the 
transformation of ever more national public goods (like open markets, protection of the environment, 
human rights) into international public goods. In addition to the “coherence gap” and “legitimacy 
gap” discussed by Lamy, the “sovereign equality of states” also entails “jurisdiction gaps,” 
“governance gaps,” “incentive gaps,” “participation gaps” and transnational “rule of law gaps” 
impeding collective supply of global public goods.
16
 The EU model of reducing such “gaps” by 
regional “communitarization,” legalization and “constitutionalization” of economic and environmental 
policy powers and multilevel governance institutions has so far not been followed by other regional 
economic groupings outside Europe. Also the example of EU membership in the WTO—facilitating 
transformation of national and regional into global public goods, as illustrated by the EU’s leadership 
role in the Doha Round negotiations—has not been followed by other regional trade organizations. 
The co-decision powers of the directly elected European Parliament go far beyond the more limited 
powers of parliamentary bodies in other multilateral treaties. The additional layer of parliamentary 
“input legitimacy” in multilevel European governance has entailed increasing “politicization” of 
decision-making, which risks undermining the “output legitimacy” of the EU’s co-decision-making by 
non-transparent interest group politics. The leading role of the EU in adopting and implementing the 
1997/2005 Kyoto Protocol and enabling the 2012 “Durban agreement” on a new climate prevention 
convention are successful examples of EU leadership in promoting global public goods and setting 
decentralized incentives for their collective supply (e.g., through the European carbon-emission 
trading systems and its inclusion of foreign airlines flying to and from the EU). The non-
discriminatory nature of the EU’s carbon-emission trading regime and the global recognition of the 
need for carbon-emission reductions in order to limit the risks of irreversible climate change suggest 
that the opposition by third countries to the inclusion of their airlines into the European carbon-
emission trading system is based more on political than on legal and environmental grounds.
17
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C. Legitimacy Problems of Multilevel “Governance Failures” 
The failure of concluding the Doha Round negotiations after more than 11 years of worldwide 
negotiations, like the failure of the European Monetary Union to prevent the persistent violations of 
the Lisbon Treaty’s fiscal, debt and economic convergence disciplines by 23 out of 27 EU member 
states leading to private and public debt crises ushering in EU bailout agreements with ever more EU 
member governments (like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) at the expense of European 
taxpayers, illustrate the limits of multilevel governance even in the most developed worldwide and 
regional organizations. Most UN institutions likewise fail to realize their declared policy objectives 
effectively such as poverty reduction, food security, international peace, rule of law, and global 
protection of human rights and of the environment. Just as the fiscal, debt, economic growth and rule 
of law crises in some EU member states are caused by national governance failures (e.g., to respect 
the agreed fiscal, debt and economic convergence disciplines) and by collusion among economic and 
political interest groups (e.g., offering subsidies and bailout agreements in exchange for political 
support and the financing of government bonds),
18
 so is the opposition against additional market 
access commitments and market regulation in the Doha Round negotiations due to vested interest 
groups benefitting from protectionism at the expense of consumer welfare (e.g., politicians and 
customs officials in less-developed countries, agricultural interest groups in developed countries). 
Human rights and democracy support Lamy’s call for compensating government-based “secondary 
legitimacy” by additional, citizen-based “primary legitimacy” of “intergovernmental regulators” of 
international cooperation among citizens (like the UN and the WTO). Yet, diplomats tend to benefit 
from the lack of legal, judicial and democratic accountability of their discretionary foreign policy 
powers and often deny that intergovernmental rule-making should be held to be illegitimate if 
international organizations cannot achieve what governments do not allow them to do and often fail to 
do themselves. Also “private-public partnerships” (e.g., in the “UN Global Compact” for “Corporate 
Social Responsibility” with more than 8,000 transnational corporations) and “tripartite structures” (as 
in the ILO) risk being abused for corporatist purposes undermining non-discriminatory market 
regulations.
19
 Public and private power structures prevail over the reasonable self-interests of citizens 
in individual and democratic self-government based on cosmopolitan rights and transnational rule of 
law. From the perspective of citizens and their human rights, the “composite nature” of the global 
division of labour and of other “aggregate public goods” calls for protecting rights of citizens (e.g., as 
main economic actors, consumers and “democratic principals”) no less than rights of governments and 
states. The often artificial “foreign-domestic policy divide” entails that—even though “aggregate 
international public goods” extend national public goods across frontiers and international law requires 
treaties to be implemented in domestic legal systems in good faith in conformity with the human rights 
obligations of all UN member states—most international trade, environmental and human rights 
treaties fail to effectively protect international public goods for the benefit of citizens. 
Intergovernmental rule-making treating citizens as mere objects is also inconsistent with the 
requirement of modern theories of justice that protection of constitutional rights of citizens requires 
constitutional, legislative, executive, judicial and international transformation of the constitutionally 
agreed principles of justice into national and international legislation, rules-based administration and 
judicial protection of “rule of law” for the benefit of citizens.20 Theories of justice explain why—for 
instance in European economic law as well as in international investment and human rights law—
“courts of justice”, like the EU Court (CJEU) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA )Court, 
legitimately protect cosmopolitan and human rights vis-à-vis welfare-reducing violations of 
international agreements. Transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens is an “intermediate 
public good” of constitutional importance for protecting interdependent “aggregate public goods” (like 
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human rights, international common markets); governmental violations of transnational rule of law 
risk undermining the overall coherence of public goods as well as the legitimacy of multilevel 
governance vis-à-vis citizens. Modern economics rightly postulates that human welfare depends more 
on the “human capital” of a people to realize its human capacities and collective responsibility to 
institutionalize reasonable rules (e.g., for an efficient division of labour, rule of law promoting 
investments) than on scarce natural resources. The “conditionality” of IMF and EU financial 
assistance to member states with balance-of-payments or “sovereign debt” problems illustrates why 
Westphalian “state sovereignty” has to be re-interpreted as “responsible sovereignty” requiring 
protection of human rights and other public goods for the benefit of citizens. Both the global 
governance crises in UN institutions and the WTO as well as regional crisis of multilevel governance 
in European integration require additional “constitutional reforms.”21 
D. Global Market Integration Must Be “Constitutionally Embedded” 
As more than half of world trade is today composed of parts and components for “international 
production” of final products, the further reduction of transaction costs through additional Doha 
Round Agreements tends to offer benefits for all trading countries and consumers (e.g., according to 
the World Bank and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, reduced 
transaction costs worth US$900 billion in case of conclusion and implementation of the draft “Trade 
Facilitation Agreement”). Yet, many less-developed countries make their agreement to concluding the 
Doha Round negotiations dependent on additional preferential, financial and technical assistance 
commitments by developed WTO members. European integration confirms that the success of 
transnational market integration and policy integration often depends on complementary legal and 
constitutional integration. Also, HRL and the constitutional requirement of justifying governmental 
restrictions of equal freedoms suggest that 
 the liberalization of international movements of goods, services, persons, capital and related 
payments require free trade and common market rules empowering citizens and economic actors, 
limiting the regulatory powers of governments, promoting legal security, reducing transaction 
costs and protecting the fundamental rights of all affected citizens as well as their democratic 
responsibilities for institutionalizing “cosmopolitan public reason” (e.g., in terms of national 
treatment of foreign goods, services and persons); 
 the necessary limitation of transnational “market failures” as well as of “governance failures” 
(such as inter-state policy externalities) calls for the constitution of transnational legislative, 
administrative and judicial powers, whose exercise—like all public authority—needs democratic 
justification, constitutional restraints and safeguards of human rights; 
 the political justification of economic market integration and of collective supply of international 
public goods requires supplementing constitutional and parliamentary democracy at national 
levels by transnational participatory and deliberative democracy based on inclusive decision-
making processes, transnational rule of law and respect for “principles of justice” and civic 
solidarity. 
Like non-discriminatory market competition inside states, non-discriminatory market access beyond 
states and undistorted, transnational market competition are legal constructs rather than gifts of 
nature.Even  though transnational economic market integration and related legal and policy integration 
remain functionally limited and embedded into legitimately diverse, national legal systems, the 
economic, social and political forces acting and cooperating across national borders must be 
“constitutionally restrained” by the “empowering,” “limiting” and “supplementing constitutional 
functions” of transnational legal order: cosmopolitan rights and the constitution and limitation of 
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regulatory powers for the collective supply of international public goods must be “constitutionally 
embedded” into transnational participatory and deliberative democratic decision-making, judicial 
review and legal protection of cosmopolitan rights complementing national democratic systems and 
parliamentary and judicial control in the name of national “peoples.”22 In contrast to claims that 
economic globalization and international legal restraints on national policy autonomy are inconsistent 
with national democratic autonomy,
23
 states remain free to negotiate and accept binding international 
rules in conformity with their national constitutional systems and national interests (e.g., in limiting 
harmful practices of other states). International HRL and other guarantees of equal freedoms and rule 
of law across national frontiers can extend national “principles of justice,” rule of law and 
constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights to mutually beneficial, transnational cooperation 
among citizens. Yet, such “constitutional functions” of IEL and self-limitations of “national 
sovereignty” remain subject to “general exceptions” protecting sovereign rights to adopt non-
protectionist national regulation and give priority to non-economic public interests.
24
 
III. Collective Action Problems Impeding Supply of Interdependent Public Goods 
Most global UN institutions rest on power-oriented “Westphalian principles” of “sovereign equality of 
states” and intergovernmental negotiations without effective constitutional limitations of regulatory 
powers in order to protect human rights and democratic governance. Some UN and WTO institutions 
do provide for limited constitutional safeguards, such as protection of labour rights and tripartite 
representation of public interests by governments, trade unions and employers in the ILO, or the 
compulsory dispute settlement system of the WTO aimed at “providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system” through preserving “the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements” (Article 3 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding). Yet, due to the “dualist 
conceptions” of national and international legal systems prevailing in most countries and to the 
frequent disregard for the “consistent interpretation principles” underlying both national and 
international legal systems, many UN member states do not incorporate their international legal 
obligations into effective domestic legislation and prevent domestic citizens and courts from 
enforcing, e.g., UN human rights, ILO and WTO obligations for the benefit of domestic citizens.
25
 
Public goods theory emphasizes that the “supply strategies” for the different types of public goods—
such as “best shot,” “weakest link” and “aggregate public goods”—vary depending on their particular 
characteristics and the preferences of citizens and governments involved (e.g., for “internalizing 
external effects” by means of taxes, subsidies or a change in property rights).26 
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A. Diverse Public Goods May Require Diverse Supply Strategies 
Economists distinguish between non-rival and non-excludable pure public goods (like moonshine) and 
impure public goods that are either non-excludable (like common-pool resources) or non-rival (like 
club goods, patented pharmaceutical knowledge). Depending on their respective “provision paths,” 
some public goods can be supplied unilaterally by “single best efforts” (e.g., an invention); the supply 
of some other public goods depends on the “weakest links” (e.g., dyke-building, global polio 
eradication, nuclear non-proliferation); “aggregate global public goods” tend to be supplied through a 
“summation process” of local, national and regional public goods. Global public goods “differ from 
their national counterparts in terms of the complexity—the multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level 
nature—of their provision path, as well as in terms of the policy-interdependence they entail.”27 As the 
publicness and privateness of goods are often social constructs rather than innate properties, the policy 
choices and preferences of countries vis-à-vis public goods may legitimately differ. Some global 
public goods—like global transportation and communication systems—are better provided for than 
others, for instance due to political market failures (like free riding); fairness and efficiency deficits in 
international negotiations (e.g., due to power politics); organizational constraints (e.g., due to path-
dependence); policy standoffs (e.g., due to contested distributional implications); inconsistency among 
global public goods (e.g., due to conflicting preferences); and uncertainty caused by the relative 
recentness of issues. Some of these impediments have prompted policy responses in terms of new 
principles (like “duties to protect”) and new institutions (like the G20, establishment of a Green 
Climate Fund for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change). Yet, many reform measures imply 
only incremental change or policy stalemates. According to Kaul, a “certain amount of . . . global 
decision-making ‘messiness’ could well prove, in the medium and longer-term, to be the more 
efficient policy path because it might broaden and deepen the political consensus on which change 
initiatives rest.” 
B. Public Goods Regimes Often Depend on the Related Property Regimes 
Political scientists argue that the economic focus on non-rivalry and non-exclusivity of public goods 
neglects many additional reasons for the under-supply of public goods like lack of resources, 
inadequate regulation of property rights, and “capture” of regulatory institutions by organized interest 
groups: “the conventional public goods debate offers less than it promised for the analysis of social 
and political problems.”28 Economic and political analyses of the different “supply conditions” of 
public goods, of alternative instruments and institutional designs for constructing public goods, or for 
transforming public goods into “club goods” (such as the WTO) often differ. In view of the few 
examples of “pure public goods” as defined by economists, political discourse often uses the term 
“public goods” more broadly for goods that benefit and can be consumed by all citizens and are 
confronted with political problems of collective action and free riding.
29
 The decentralized, private law 
forms of the global governance of the Internet by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and 
Names (ICANN), and the settlement of thousands of international “domain name disputes” by means 
of arbitration procedures administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and 
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enforced by ICANN, illustrate the potential importance of decentralized, rights-based regimes 
transforming global public goods into institutionalized “club goods” so as to limit incentives for “free 
riding” and create incentives for supporting club goods. Even though there is no “one size fits all” 
solution to the problems of “common pool resources,” sub-optimal supply of many international 
public goods (like sustainable high seas fisheries) is often related to the property regime, whose 
change may—as explained by Kratochwil—transform the “tragedy of the commons” by limiting 
membership and over-use. Rather than resolving a prisoners’ dilemma by focusing on the two 
alternatives of government intervention or privatization, legal differentiation between different types 
of ownership rights (e.g., rights of access, extraction, management, exclusion) may enable more 
effective provision of public goods. 
C. Need for Comparative Legal and Institutional Analyses of Public Goods Regimes 
As national public goods continue to be supplied by states with legislative, executive and judicial 
powers (e.g., to tax and coerce citizens) that rarely exist in international institutions, the collective 
supply of transnational public goods remains characterized by multilevel, legal and institutional 
experimentation. The diversity of UN Specialized Agencies and of other worldwide and regional 
agreements on protection of international public goods offers empirical evidence for the theoretical 
insights that 
 the regulatory governance problems and institutional needs of “aggregate public goods” tend to 
be different from those of “best effort public goods” and “weakest link public goods,” whose 
supply may be possible within more limited legal and institutional frameworks; 
 the legal design of the collective supply of international “aggregate public goods” (such as 
human and labour rights) may legitimately differ in response to their regulatory problems, for 
instance regarding the decision-making procedures of political UN institutions (e.g., the veto 
powers of the permanent members of the UN Security Council), financial UN institutions (e.g., 
the weighted voting powers of members of the Bretton Woods institutions) and the ILO with its 
tripartite membership and voting rules; 
 the “horizontal” legal regulation of “overlaps,” cooperation and conflicts between interdependent 
public goods (e.g., the relationships of GATT and the WTO to other UN Specialized Agencies) 
tends to be incomplete and to dynamically evolve in response to newly emerging regulatory 
challenges, as illustrated by the GATT/WTO rules (such as GATT Articles XII to XV) and 
declarations on cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions, the ILO, WIPO, WHO and 
environmental organizations; 
 also the regulation of the “vertical interactions” among international and domestic legal regimes 
reveals a variety of legal approaches, as illustrated by the more limited remedies for reparation 
of injury caused by treaty violations in the WTO compared with the rules on state responsibility 
applied by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
Comparative analysis of the existing reality of “international legal and institutional pluralism” 
suggests that citizen-driven, rights-based human rights conventions (like the ECHR) and economic 
integration agreements in Europe (like the EU and the EEA) have protected cosmopolitan rights, 
judicial remedies and transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens more comprehensively and 
effectively than state-centred human rights and economic agreements (e.g., in Africa) without 
equivalent individual and judicial remedies against violations of erga omnes obligations (like human 
rights, fundamental freedoms of EU and EEA law). While the supply of some global public goods has 
been assigned to UN Specialized Agencies, the supply of other global public goods has been attributed 
to institutions with limited membership (such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
elaborating international rules on bank capital requirements). UN conventions providing for legal and 
institutional protection of “common heritage of mankind” beyond national jurisdictions (like the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) appear to have been more effective than multilateral 
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conventions recognizing merely “common concerns” (like the 1992 UN Conventions on Biological 
Diversity and on Climate Change). Multilateral agreements on the protection of the environment have 
been more successful if they included financial support for rule-compliance in less-developed 
countries and sanctions against “free-riding” third countries (as in the case of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol on the Protection of the Ozone Layer). The common patterns of many multilateral 
environmental agreements—e.g., their initial design as framework conventions without enforcement 
powers, whose rules were progressively supplemented by additional Protocols with more precise 
regulations—illustrates how international institutions can promote learning processes and incentives 
for progressive rule-clarification in cooperation with non-governmental interest groups. Treaty 
provisions on “enhanced cooperation” among “coalitions of willing countries” (e.g., pursuant to 
Article 20 TEU), on “plurilateral agreements” among some of the WTO member states (like the 2011 
Government Procurement Agreement), and on regional trade agreements (e.g., pursuant to Articles 
XXIV GATT and V GATS) may likewise set incentives for “competing regulation” and institutional 
experimentation. Economic public goods theory offers few criteria as to when global public goods 
should be regulated issue by issue (e.g., pursuant to the economic theory of separation of policy 
instruments underlying the separate UN Specialized Agencies) or by means of package deals 
facilitating compromises over the distribution of costs and benefits (as in the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Agreement establishing the WTO). 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was 
undermined by the fact that the nuclear powers neither complied with their own commitments to phase 
out the number of nuclear war materials nor prevented strategically important countries (like Israel and 
India) from developing nuclear bombs. Many other “weakest link public goods” (like eradication of 
polio, prevention of pirates) were undermined by unwilling or unable “failing states” lacking the 
resources or the political capability to protect agreed international public goods. International 
assistance for overcoming such “weakest-link public goods problems” may sometimes be solved 
through unilateral action by a few donor nations without necessitating worldwide governance 
mechanisms.
30
 Yet, external coercion may be an inevitable ultima ratio against “rogue states” 
deliberately undermining international public goods (like the Taliban government in Afghanistan 
destroying cultural world heritage like the Giant Buddha at Bamiyan and promoting terrorism abroad). 
Also in the case of “single-best effort goods problems” which can be supplied by one or few actor(s), 
the international governance problems (e.g., of climate change “geo-engineering” through injection of 
stratospheric aerosols) may not require global organizations with legislative and enforcement powers. 
Yet, unilateral supply of international public goods may create international conflicts due to adverse 
externalities for states that would benefit from the undersupply of the international public good 
concerned (e.g., climate change promoting the melting of the ice and new opportunities of mineral 
exploitation in the Arctic). 
D. Rule-Making and Compliance Depend on Procedural Fairness and “Responsible Sovereignty” 
International agreement on which and how many public goods to provide often depends on the “input 
legitimacy” of the rule-making procedures and on the distribution of the respective costs and benefits. 
For instance, the US leadership for the elaboration and adoption of the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Agreements, the 1945 UN Charter, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) and for 
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was not only due to the hegemonic position 
of the United States after World War II and to the US willingness to cover most of the “negotiating 
costs” (e.g., of the 1944 Bretton Woods, 1945 San Francisco and 1947 New York conferences); no 
less important for securing broad international consent were the US efforts at promoting inclusive 
negotiations and “principled justifications” of a liberal post-war international order based on 
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“sovereign equality of states,” decolonization and respect for human rights. Even though all UN 
member states have accepted human rights obligations under UN treaty law as well as under general 
international law, governments and academics continue to disagree on whether the legitimacy and 
efficiency of the law of international organizations and of multilevel governance institutions can be 
promoted best by “constitutional approaches,” “global administrative law approaches” or “legal 
pluralist approaches” to multilevel regulation of transnational public goods.31 The under-supply of 
international public goods reveals a “leadership vacuum” in most UN and WTO institutions. 
Paradoxically, the evolution from the comparatively weak GATT 1947—in spite of its lack of legal 
ratification, weak institutions and “grandfather exceptions” exempting inconsistent national 
legislation—into the worldwide WTO legal and compulsory dispute settlement system was more 
successful than the evolution of the Bretton Woods Agreements that had been duly ratified by national 
parliaments. Yet, the ever larger number of trade agreements concluded outside the WTO, the failure 
to conclude the Doha Round negotiations, and other “governance gaps” confirm the “legitimacy 
deficits” and “constitutional limits” of intergovernmental power politics as a legitimate tool for 
protecting global public goods. Waiting for global consensus (e.g., among 158 WTO members) has 
proven to be an unreasonable negotiation strategy, just as the “single undertaking method” and 
consensus-based amendment procedures of WTO law risk being impractical “implementation 
strategies.” 
In the worldwide Doha and climate change negotiations, some of the “governance failures” to reach 
agreement are related to disagreements on the distribution of costs and benefits (e.g., in less-developed 
countries refusing WTO disciplines on welfare-reducing government practices like non-transparent 
government procurement). Harmful “externalities” are often a major impediment to collective supply 
of public goods, as illustrated by the harmful impact of illegal US cotton subsidies on African and 
Latin-American cotton-exporting countries opposing conclusion of a “Doha Development Round” 
without prior US compliance with the WTO dispute settlement rulings of November 2001 on US 
cotton subsidies; this continuing US non-compliance illustrates how rent-seeking lobbies financing the 
election campaigns of US politicians are often politically more powerful than consumer interests in 
rules-based, liberal trade and avoidance of wasteful subsidy practices violating US legal obligations 
under WTO law. Reconciling national and transnational self-interests requires “responsible 
sovereignty” based on the neglected insight that—as a result of the transformation of ever more 
national into international public goods—national constitutions have become “partial constitutions” 
that can protect ever more “aggregate public goods” only in conformity with international law and 
international institutions for the collective supply of international public goods. If governments do not 
engage in international cooperation in the enlightened national self-interest to protect interdependent 
“aggregate public goods,” the cooperating countries may decide to transform global public goods into 
“club goods” and provide for sanctions against free-riding third countries (e.g., under the Montreal 
Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer); violations of the legal obligations of all UN 
member states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights erga omnes as well as of other “duties to 
protect” internationally agreed “common concerns” may also justify recourse to international dispute 
settlement procedures and reprisals from adversely affected third countries. 
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IV. Lessons from Case-Studies of the “Interface Problems” of the World Trading, 
Environment and Development Systems 
The new global governance institutions (like the G20 group of 19 “systemically significant” 
industrialized and emerging economies plus the EU) and collective action problems in multilevel 
trade, development and environmental governance can be evaluated best by case-studies. 
A. How to Improve the Multilevel Economic Governance by the G20 
The G20 was established in 1999 pursuant to a proposal by the G7 finance ministers and central bank 
governors in response to the experience during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s that the G7 
structure did not enable adequate responses to global financial and economic crises. The G20 is in a 
powerful position to promote the global common good, and to make it prevail, at times, against 
narrow, short-term interpretations of national interests.
32
 But it is much less clear whether the needed 
improvements of “G20 governance” should be inspired by lessons from multilevel European 
governance, for instance in order to institutionalize the G20 as a more effective and more legitimate 
global governance executive. For example, the “competence catalogues” of the Lisbon Treaty listing 
various categories of EU competences (cf. Articles 3–6 of the TFEU on exclusive, shared, parallel and 
supporting competences), and limiting their exercise by constitutional principles (e.g., in Articles 2–6 
of the TEU), neither prevented daily turf battles on shared competences nor newly emerging modes of 
multilevel governance (e.g., of the Eurozone crisis among 17 EU member states). The 27 EU member 
states have transferred more legislative and policy powers to supranational institutions than any other 
group of states. But a comparison of the European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1951 with the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty shows that the design of EU institutions evolved through trial and error. According to Wouters 
and Ramopoulos, it is “hard to draw generalizing lessons from this very specific process for the 
provision of global public goods” and for the organization of global governance institutions. For 
instance, does the transformation of the EU Council from a “political directorate” operating outside 
the EU Treaties (essentially until 1986) into a Treaty institution (Article 15 TEU) offer lessons for 
reforming the G20 as today’s “premier forum for international economic cooperation”? How should 
the G20 be coordinated with alternative modes of governance (like markets, hierarchical 
organizations, informal networks)? Should the G20’s currently informal mode of negotiating 
agreements as a “diplomatic club” in a culture of reciprocity be changed, for instance by creating a 
permanent G20 Secretariat, transforming the G20 into a “Council of Governors” of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the WTO, or by otherwise promoting synergies through regular delegation of tasks to 
existing or new organizations (like the Financial Stability Board), thereby enhancing decision-making 
in international organizations (like the WTO) or “rebalancing” and initiating reforms of existing 
institutions (like the IMF)? Could the “representative voice” and deliberative legitimacy of G20 
meetings be enhanced by stronger stakeholder involvement (such as participation of NGOs) and by 
offering G20 membership also to the African Union (as South Africa remains the only G20 member 
from Africa)? Europe’s declining influence in global governance, as illustrated by the European debt 
crisis overshadowing the 2011 and 2012 G20 summit meetings and by related tendencies to re-
nationalize European monetary and debt governance, render a “Europeanization of the G20” inspired 
by principles of EU integration unlikely. 
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B. How to Improve Multilevel Environmental Governance? 
The very limited results of the successive UN conferences on climate change prevention raise urgent 
policy questions about how worldwide and regional efforts at climate change prevention can be 
rendered more successful. The case-study by Daniel Esty and Anthony Moffa
33
 illustrates the 
“collective action problems” and potential tragedy of the “global commons” (like the atmosphere): 
neither can the harmful externalities of national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on global warming, 
sea level rise, changed rainfall patterns and increased hurricanes be successfully addressed by any 
nation acting alone; nor do countries agree on worldwide disciplines, institutions and the sharing of the 
related costs and benefits of emission-control necessary for preventing climate change and global 
over-exploitation of a limited resource. According to Esty and Moffa, the reasons for the failure of the 
complex web of institutions and programs aimed at mitigating climate change can be grouped into 
three main categories: political economy considerations, negotiation roadblocks, and inadequate 
institutional structures ensuring adherence to shared commitments in the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Overcoming these collective action problems requires establishing a 
Global Environmental Organization and close coordination of the world trade and climate change 
regimes. While the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC implemented its principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (Article 10) by exempting less-developed countries from binding GHG 
reduction commitments, the “Durban Agreement” of 2011 envisages replacing the Kyoto Protocol by 
a new treaty providing for GHG reduction commitments also by less-developed countries like Brazil, 
China and India that have become major polluters. But the cost-benefit calculations regarding the 
optimal level of GHG reduction commitments of developed and less-developed countries, as well as of 
individual industries and companies, continue to differ enormously. 
In view of the increasing unlikelihood of an effective UN convention on climate change prevention, 
the examination of national and regional policy alternatives is ever more important. The case-study by 
Moritz Hartmann
34
 describes the transition from the worldwide recognition of climate change as a 
“common concern” in the 1992 UNFCCC towards the progressive “institutionalization of polycentric 
regulation” and “experimental regional climate change governance” so as to fill the “regulatory 
vacuum” at the global level (e.g., in the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and WTO law). Comparing 
regional emissions trading schemes in Europe and North-America and the complementary use of 
border tax adjustments for protecting the global public good of GHG reductions is paradigmatic also 
for the regulation of other “global environmental commons” requiring a multitude of regulatory 
strategies and levels. The focus on market-based environmental regulation and on outsourcing 
responsibilities for achieving emission reductions on behalf of states and international organizations 
illustrates the “regulatory multipolarity” and “polycentric international regulatory order” required for 
dealing with inter-generational, environmental problems affecting all states, billions of individuals and 
distorting the worldwide division of labour. The 2011 “Durban Agreement,” or the international 
dispute over the inclusion of foreign airlines into the EU’s carbon-emission trading system,35 reflect 
widespread doubts whether “marketization” of carbon dioxide emissions is the best methodology of 
climate change prevention. Hartmann’s detailed comparison of European and North American 
regulatory approaches identifies numerous problems in the implementation of the EU’s emission 
trading system (e.g., over-allocation of permits in 2007–2008, inadequate incentives for reducing CO2 
emissions on larger scales) as well as in sub-federal climate change regulations at state and local levels 
in response to the US refusal to accept international GHG reduction commitments and develop a 
federal emission trading scheme. Recent proposals to link regional carbon-emission trading systems 
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(e.g., in Australia, California and the EU) have not yet been realized. “Border carbon adjustments” 
may be a necessary, supplementary policy instrument and legally justifiable under WTO law, 
notwithstanding risks of manipulating carbon taxes for protectionist purposes. Yet, polycentric, 
market-based regulation may neither change individual behaviour nor reduce extensive carbon 
emissions unless external authorities impose enforceable rules that change the incentives faced by 
environmental polluters based on a “transnational rule of law” system protecting coherence between 
private and public, national and international levels of governance for the benefit of citizens. 
The protection of biodiversity in the context of the 1992 UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) as the 
principal framework for biodiversity protection in a highly fragmented, multilevel biodiversity regime 
offers another case-study of progressive, multilevel regulation of “global environmental commons.”36 
The CBD’s focus is less on “command-and-control regulation” than on legal, economic and other 
tools to incentivise the private sector contribution as a decentralized instrument for implementing a 
global environmental treaty and reducing related collective action problems. Even though the CBD 
aims at protecting primarily national resources by means of instruments different from those used for 
climate change protection, the “common concern” at protecting biodiversity is recognized. Some 
market-based, regulatory instruments overlap with the Kyoto Protocol’s “flexible mechanisms” (like 
the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD mechanism)); they 
confirm the importance of involving the private sector and changing individual behaviour by 
incentives for sustainable biodiversity management based on duties of “custodial sovereignty.” Jerneja 
Penca identifies the regulatory deficiencies of the CBD (e.g., its lack of effective enforcement 
provisions) and related distributional problems (e.g., regarding “fair and equitable benefit-sharing” 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, inadequate resources of the Global Environmental 
Facility). As in the case of carbon-emission trading systems, the increasing use of certification of 
environmental products, ecosystem services (like the REDD), “business biodiversity offsets,” 
environment-related codes of conduct (e.g., the Equator Principles and other performance standards 
used by the International Finance Corporation) and of “green development mechanisms” illustrate that 
“there can be a business case for investing in biodiversity conservation” and promoting private-sector 
integration in the CBD. The increasing number of bilateral initiatives supporting the implementation 
of the 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing illustrates that—as in the case of the 
bilateral trade agreements concluded by the EU and United States with explicit references to other 
worldwide environmental agreements like the 1973 UN Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species—unilateral and bilaterally agreed initiatives for the protection of global 
environmental goods can offer important “second-best instruments” and non-judicial enforcement 
incentives as long as multilateral environmental framework rules do not yet include effective 
worldwide compliance and enforcement mechanisms: universal recognition of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” may justify private and public, unilateral, bilateral and plurilateral 
leadership initiatives and “legal building blocks” for protecting global public goods.37 
C. “Disconnected Governance” of Interconnected Public Goods? 
A liberal world trading system can be perceived as a global public good offering potential gains from 
trade also for those countries that do not join more limited “club goods” like the WTO and regional 
free trade agreements. Yet, trade liberalization may also cause adjustment costs to import-competing 
industries inside countries even if the importing country might use some of its national “gains from 
trade” for compensating the losers. The rule-making and dispute settlement functions of international 
trade organizations like the WTO provide additional public goods, for instance by progressively 
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clarifying the meaning of WTO rules, addressing harmful “externalities” of unilateral trade policy 
actions, negotiating new trade rules on the liberalization and regulation of trade, and “providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” (Article 3 WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding).
38
 Article V of the WTO Agreement also requires the WTO General Council to “make 
appropriate arrangements for effective cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations that 
have responsibilities related to those of the WTO” (para. 1); the General Council “may make 
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations 
concerned with matters related to those of the WTO” (para. 2). The “horizontal” and “vertical” 
interconnections between the international trading, environmental, “sustainable development” and 
related legal systems are regulated more specifically in a number of GATT/WTO provisions (like 
GATT Articles XII–XV, XVIII) and WTO Declarations on the relations of WTO law and institutions 
with UN institutions (like the ILO, WHO, WIPO), “sustainable development” and environmental 
agreements in order to avoid the risk of circumventing separate legal regimes by resorting, for 
example, to monetary policy or environmental measures that “nullify or impair” previous trade 
commitments in terms of GATT Article XXIII. The common core of these WTO rules is that—even 
though the UN Charter conceptualizes “sustainable development” as a collective task of providing 
global public goods in a network of international organizations open to all UN member states, and the 
UN Specialized Agencies and other institutions outside the UN framework (e.g., GATT and WTO) 
evolved in diverse ways—UN law, GATT/WTO law and domestic legal systems must be construed in 
mutually coherent ways in conformity with the “consistent interpretation principles” underlying 
national and international legal systems.
39
 
UN law and WTO law also refer to most of the “principles of fairness” necessary for successful 
negotiations over global public goods, such as principles of distributive justice (like “sovereign 
equality of states,” equal human rights), corrective justice (like state responsibility, reparation of injury 
caused by violations of international law), commutative justice (like pacta sunt servanda, reciprocity 
and mutual advantage) and equity, whose precise definition may legitimately vary in particular 
contexts (like non-reciprocal trade preferences for least-developed countries in the WTO); principles 
of proportionality (e.g., regarding allocation of financial contributions, “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” in multilateral environmental agreements); respect for human needs, acquired rights 
and for “compensatory justice” (e.g., vis-à-vis former colonial territories); and procedural principles of 
“justice as fairness,” “voluntary acceptance” and peaceful settlement of disputes.40 Yet, in worldwide 
UN and WTO negotiations, the pursuit of justice as a “balanced settlement of conflicting claims”41 
continues to be often distorted by intergovernmental power politics and “rent-seeking” efforts (e.g., to 
avoid the costs of climate change mitigation by refusing reduction commitments for greenhouse gas 
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol). The “triangle of global governance” (Pascal Lamy)—based on 
the UN, Specialized Agencies and the G20 as a “Global Economic Governance Executive”—remains 
characterized by “legitimacy deficits” and “decision traps” such as the “consensus principle” impeding 
the conclusion of GATT and WTO Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. In the Doha Round 
negotiations, for example, less-developed WTO members express dissatisfaction over inadequate 
commitments by developed countries (e.g., in terms of “special and differential treatment,” the 
“enabling clause,” liberalization of agricultural trade and of international movements of natural service 
providers); the latter criticize the former for maintaining too many welfare-reducing impediments and 
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trade barriers. Even though the World Bank estimated that conclusion of the draft Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation in the context of the Doha Round negotiations could offer additional trading gains in the 
order of US$900 billion, several less-developed WTO members make their consent to concluding this 
Doha Round agreement conditional on additional commitments by developed WTO members. As long 
as trade policy-making remains dominated in most countries by protectionist interest groups, claims by 
governments maintaining trade barriers at home and requesting non-reciprocal trade liberalization 
abroad are bound to remain contested. In spite of the enormous “opportunity costs” of the failure to 
conclude the proposed Doha Round Agreements, it remains uncertain whether the consensus-based 
WTO negotiations among more than 150 countries with often conflicting domestic interests will ever 
reach agreement on a “single undertaking” by all WTO members on liberalizing and regulating 
international trade in goods, services, intellectual property rights and “sustainable development.” The 
policy responses of WTO members to the collective action problems in the Doha Round 
negotiations—such as recourse to ever more free trade agreements and plurilateral agreements (like 
the 2011 Government Procurement Agreement among 42 WTO members) pending the failure to 
conclude the Doha Round negotiations—reflect many insights from public goods theories (like the 
need to exclude “free riders”); since the repeal of the British “corn laws” in 1846, the world trading 
regime continues to evolve through dialectic processes of unilateralism, bilateralism and 
multilateralism ushering in the 1994 WTO Agreement only after ever more regional and “plurilateral 
agreements” (like the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements among limited numbers of GATT contracting 
parties) had set sufficient incentives for third countries to join worldwide agreements. 
The need for more participatory, multi-stakeholder decision-making on global public goods involving 
citizens, civil society and business is also evident in the UN and WTO efforts at protecting public 
health.
42
 The 2001 Doha Declaration on the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights and Public Health has promoted cooperation (e.g., among the WHO, WIPO and WTO), 
research and funding for the development, procurement and distribution of medicines for diseases 
predominantly affecting individuals in less-developed countries. Nonetheless, problems in providing 
essential health services and limiting harmful tobacco consumption remain to be addressed in both 
developed and less-developed countries. The negotiation and conclusion outside the WTO framework 
of the 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement among more than 20 countries, and the initiation—
in 2012—of WTO dispute settlement procedures and investment arbitration challenging the tobacco 
plain packaging legislation of Australia, illustrate how governments continue to choose among 
alternative multilateral fora, regional or bilateral mechanisms “for securing strategic advantage.” The 
WTO’s 1994 “coherence mandate” explicitly urging the WTO to strengthen its ties with the IMF and 
the World Bank in order to promote their common objectives (such as improving living standards, 
“sustainable development” and international trade) has enhanced cooperation among the WTO and the 
World Bank in promoting the “development dimension” of WTO rules and policies.43 The UN and its 
specialized agencies provide only for limited, compulsory jurisdiction for the judicial settlement of 
international disputes (e.g., by the ICJ, WIPO arbitration) and for alternative remedies and sanction 
procedures (e.g., by the UN Security Council, the World Bank Inspection Panel procedure and 
sanctions procedures in case of corruption, fraud, coercion and collusion). Most international disputes 
over potential conflicts between the legally separate WTO, WIPO, WHO, World Bank and multilateral 
environmental regimes—for instance, in case of trade and environmental regulations of emission 
reductions, border tax adjustments, emission trading systems, subsidies and environment-related 
goods, services and intellectual property rights—are, therefore, likely to be submitted to the 
compulsory WTO dispute settlement system. As only few IMF, FAO and WIPO rules have become 
explicitly incorporated into WTO law, the modes of cooperation between the WTO and other UN 
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Specialized Agencies and related dispute settlement procedures (e.g., over exchange rate 
manipulations) continue to evolve pragmatically. 
D. Limitation of Multilevel Governance Failures through Democratic and Constitutional Reforms? 
The acknowledgment—in the practices not only of WHO and WIPO, but also of the World Bank and 
more recently the WTO—of connections between development and human rights (e.g., of access to 
food and essential medicines, rights to private property, rule of law and legal remedies) is likely to 
enhance not only the “primary legitimacy” (Pascal Lamy) of promoting international public goods 
through UN Specialized Agencies and trade institutions; also HRL may benefit from the discourse 
among economic institutions and UN human rights bodies and UN human rights rapporteurs 
requesting international organizations to “respect, protect and fulfil” human rights by adjusting 
economic rules (e.g., WTO rules on liberalization of agricultural trade).
44
 The need for justifying law 
and governmental restrictions of equal freedoms of citizens can be perceived as an integral part of 
human rights and as a precondition of institutionalizing “public reason” and “principles of justice” 
through democratic discourse.
45
 In view of the only limited control by national parliaments of 
multilevel economic and environmental governance, the democratic support necessary for limiting 
governance failures in IEL and for protecting international public goods more effectively requires 
more involvement of citizens in participatory and deliberative democratic governance of public goods. 
For instance, 
 “free riding” can be limited by clarifying property rights and judicial remedies of citizens and 
transforming public goods into “club goods” administered by international organizations; 
 other governance failures may be limited by promoting “access rights,” property rights and 
multilevel judicial protection of “rule of law”; 
 the citizen-driven reforms of European competition, common market and human rights law 
through multilevel democratic and “judicial governance” illustrate that cosmopolitan rights and 
judicial remedies of citizens can limit and transform intergovernmental power politics into 
rights-based, transnational cooperation among citizens. 
Just as the regulation of trade policy instruments in GATT/WTO law has been based on the “economic 
theory of optimal intervention” (e.g., as developed by Nobel Prize laureate James Meade), economics 
is important for regulating alternative policy instruments in environmental agreements (e.g., promotion 
of “positive externalities” from the use of forests as “carbon sinks”). Many regulatory problems 
require supplementing the economic tools of public goods theory by complementary political and 
legal analyses. For example, under what conditions should “issue-by-issue regulation” (pursuant to 
Jan Tinbergen’s theory of “separation of policy instruments”) be replaced by “issue-linkages” in order 
to promote regulatory coherence and overcome disputes over the distribution of costs and benefits? 
How should decision-making processes be designed in order to limit the risks of “regulatory capture” 
by organized interest groups and enhance both “input-legitimacy” as well as “output-legitimacy” of 
regulation? How can principles like “responsible sovereignty” and “common concerns” be 
transformed into precise “duties to protect” public goods in transnational relations vis-à-vis third 
countries that refuse to cooperate in global agreements? The “horizontal” as well as “vertical 
interdependencies” between national and international monetary, trading, environmental, development 
and legal systems require economic, political as well as legal coordination mechanisms (as 
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acknowledged in GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V on regional trading systems). The failure 
of the G20 in offering effective leadership for concluding the Doha Development Round negotiations 
illustrates that many multilevel governance problems are related to lack of “public reason” and 
democratic support at domestic policy levels. The continuing under-regulation of global financial 
markets is also related to political disagreements as to whether regional reforms (such as the creation 
of a “Systemic Risk Board” inside the European Monetary Union) offer lessons for reforming the 
worldwide monetary and financial system. The case-studies on carbon-emission trading systems and 
on private-public partnerships in biodiversity protection illustrated the importance of involving non-
governmental actors for effective international trade and environmental regulation, for instance by 
empowering and incentivizing citizens and business (e.g., by means of land and other property rights) 
to use environmental resources efficiently and to act (e.g., by means of legal and judicial remedies) as 
advocates for decentralized enforcement of trade and environmental rules. Citizen-driven, market-
based instruments of economic regulation can complement democratic self-government and 
decentralized, self-interested enforcement of rule of law, provided there are adequate safeguards 
against abuses of private rights. The increasing importance of terrestrial and marine protected areas as 
“green” and “blue” carbon sinks illustrates the need for promoting synergies among separate treaty 
regimes so as to enhance “sustainable development.” Just as the WTO legal system is of crucial 
importance for resolving some of the collective action problems relating to energy security (e.g., by 
protecting non-discriminatory market access and transit trade), coordination of international trade, 
health protection and environmental rules is of crucial importance also for interdependent global 
public goods like GHG reductions (e.g., by means of carbon tariffs, non-discriminatory taxes), 
biodiversity and access to essential medicines. Environmental public goods illustrate the 
methodological importance of identifying where and how public goods can be produced most 
efficiently; regulation should intervene directly at the source of market and governance failures 
without causing “by-product distortions” of economic competition. The potential for avoiding 
multilateral collective action problems by recourse to bilateral agreements (e.g., on access to energy 
resources and genetic resources), or by “localizing” and downscaling global challenges to smaller 
regional or local levels, depend on the type of public goods. National borders will continue to matter 
legally and politically as places where regulatory systems change and where domestic implementation 
of international rules requires democratic legitimation and protection of the rights of citizens. 
V. Constitutional and Legal Problems of Multilevel Governance of Public Goods 
The universal recognition, for instance in more than 100 UN human rights instruments, of human 
rights and of the need for democratic governance require justifying law and governance through 
participatory, deliberative and representative democratic procedures and other “principles of justice” 
recognizing citizens as legal subjects of legal and democratic self-governance. If legitimate 
“governance” is defined as collective production of public goods by adjusting rules to the changing 
demands, needs and democratic rights of citizens, it is difficult to explain why public goods theory has 
so far neglected the constitutional dimensions of multilevel governance of interdependent public 
goods. Also international law (as an intermediate “global public good”), the interrelationships between 
multilateral treaty rules and institutions for global public goods,
46
 and the political need for their 
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support by “multi-layered issue communities”47 are neglected by many economists, political scientists 
and diplomats. Due to insufficient empirical and comparative analyses of international “public goods 
regimes” and to disagreement on the appropriate political, economic and legal “methodologies,” the 
governance arrangements for transnational public goods lack coherent theories. Legal methodology—
e.g., in terms of the respective conceptions of the sources and “rules of recognition” of law, the 
methods of interpretation, the functions and systemic nature of legal systems, and of their relationships 
to other areas of law and politics—remains neglected and contested in IEL research and practices, for 
instance because legal interpretations might arrive at different conclusions depending on the respective 
“legal methodologies” applied. Due to “Westphalian path-dependence,” also the legislative and 
executive “governance modes” and “judicial methodologies” applied by worldwide institutions 
continue to differ from those applied by constitutionally more limited regional and national 
governance institutions. Many of the current governance problems in the WTO trading system (as the 
most developed worldwide legal and compulsory dispute settlement system) are likely to be 
experienced later in other international public goods regimes. 
A. Public Goods Theory Must Integrate Legal and Constitutional Theories 
As the provision of “public goods” is the main justification of states and of other public organizations, 
legal and political research on “public goods” is much older than the economic distinction between 
private and public goods in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). The different kinds of public 
organizations (e.g., since the ancient Greek city republics) for supplying public goods raise different 
kinds of legal and political governance problems. Yet, as explained by John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 
the legitimacy and coherence of legal governance systems depends on their justification by, and 
progressive implementation of “principles of justice” through constitutional, legislative, executive and 
judicial rules and institutions, including international law and institutions for the collective supply of 
transnational public goods.
48
 As UN law has never adopted effective constitutional, legislative and 
judicial safeguards of human rights, the lack of legitimacy of UN power politics continues to 
undermine the effectiveness of UN rules and institutions. The diverse evolutions of the various UN 
Specialized Agencies since World War II illustrate that—even within similar rules for multilateral 
provision of international public goods—legal and political regimes may develop in diverse and 
unpredicted ways. 
Integration of legal and other public goods theories is impeded also by the fact that—similar to the 
story of the blind men touching different parts of an elephant and describing the same animal in 
contradictory ways—private and public, national and international lawyers continue to perceive IEL 
from competing perspectives, for instance as (1) public international law (e.g., the Bretton Woods 
Agreements), (2) “global administrative law” (e.g., the legal practices of UN Specialized Agencies and 
the WTO), (3) “conflicts law” (e.g., international commercial law and arbitration), (4) multilevel 
constitutional regulation (e.g., rights-based European economic law and adjudication) or (5) multilevel 
economic regulation of the economy (e.g., North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) law) 
within the limits of national, democratic constitutionalism.
49
 The conceptions of IEL differ because 
economic regulation and “rule of law” tend to be justified in diverse ways, for instance on grounds of 
 national or individual utility (e.g., “national interests,” public goods, welfare); 
 state consent and “sovereignty” (e.g., to adopt national legislation violating IEL); 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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 democratic or individual consent (e.g., to “regulatory takings” of property rights); 
 “public choice” (e.g., majority and interest group politics); 
 principles of “good governance,” human rights and other constitutional values (like private and 
public autonomy of arbitral tribunals). 
The universal human rights obligations of all UN member states and the customary law requirements 
of interpreting treaties, and settling related disputes, “in conformity with the principles of justice” and 
human rights (as codified in the Preamble and Article 31 of the VCLT) require interpreting and 
justifying IEL treaties in conformity with human rights and other principles of justice, as it is done by 
governments and national and European courts in all 30 member states of the EEA
50
 and increasingly 
also in regional economic and human rights courts in Latin-America
51
 as well as in investor-state 
arbitration.
52
 Such “constitutional interpretations” of economic freedoms and their “balancing” with 
other fundamental rights are likely to differ depending on whether individual freedom of action is 
protected broadly (e.g., as a constitutional “right of subjective freedom” as justified by Kant and 
Hegel) or merely as a “common law freedom” subject to whatever restrictions approved by legislative 
majorities.
53
 
B. International Public Goods Regimes Must Remain Consistent with Human Rights 
As mentioned in the Introduction, human rights and justice require justifying also international rules 
vis-à-vis citizens through general and reciprocal arguments that respect the equal private ethical, 
moral, legal, democratic and cosmopolitan autonomy of citizens and cannot be reasonably rejected by 
citizens as democratic authors of legitimate rules.
54
 Many UN and WTO member states do not make 
efforts at justifying their economic UN and WTO agreements in terms of promoting human rights and 
consumer welfare and resist legal accountability in domestic courts of justice for government 
violations of UN and WTO treaty obligations. Given the diversity of moral, legal and political 
conceptions and legal traditions of human rights and “principles of justice” and the “post-modern 
scepticism” about the objectivity of moral reasoning, governments and economic courts often prefer 
avoiding controversies about the democratic legitimacy of governments and of their competing 
conceptions of human rights and “principles of justice” if legal arguments, judgments and dispute 
settlement can be justified on the basis of textual, contextual and functional interpretations of 
economic rules. As long as international law-making remains dominated by government executives 
drafting international treaties in terms of rights and obligations of governments without effective legal 
and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens, intergovernmental power politics and discretionary 
foreign policies taxing and redistributing domestic income through discriminatory border restrictions 
are likely to evade constitutional restraints, effective democratic control and self-government of 
citizens. Due to the interdependence between national and international public goods, foreign policy 
discretion of government executives and delegation of ever more governance powers to international 
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organizations risk undermining democratic self-government also at national levels. In view of the still 
limited effectiveness of participatory, deliberative and representative democracy beyond states, 
multilevel governance requires multilevel constitutional restraints based on “principles of justice” and 
multilevel judicial protection of transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens and their human 
and constitutional rights. 
Limiting foreign policy discretion in the collective supply of international public goods raises many 
additional “constitutional problems.” As legal and political incentives for the collective supply of 
international public goods often differ from country to country, political support for international 
public goods requires additional, international and cosmopolitan (dis)incentives. For instance, as most 
international public goods regimes are based on incomplete treaty rules and institutions, provisions for 
periodical renegotiation of rules, access to international courts clarifying incomplete rules, and 
international financial institutions assisting in domestic treaty implementation and adjustment 
measures may offer incentives for progressive development of public goods regimes. Excludable but 
non-rival “club goods” (like the GATT/WTO trading system) raise governance problems different 
from those of rival but non-excludable “common pool resources” (like the high seas, the ozone layer 
and other “environmental commons”). Also “best shot public goods” (e.g., promotion of scientific 
inventions)—even if they can be produced without international legal instruments—may raise 
transnational coordination problems requiring legal regulation (e.g., of trade implications of genetic 
“production technologies,” adverse externalities of greenhouse gas mitigation through stratospheric 
aerosol injection). Production of “weakest link public goods” may often focus on a few “weak states” 
(e.g., in the fight against polio eradication, protection of UNESCO world heritage sites) and generate 
“positive externalities” (e.g., of the fight against pirates) prompting third private and public actors to 
share the costs of protecting public goods. 
C. Cosmopolitan International Legal Strategies Can Generate Democratic Support 
From the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789) up to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR 1948), many human rights instruments illustrate their emancipatory function 
by asserting individual rights of resistance and of judicial remedies (“access to justice”) against abuses 
of power. Limiting intergovernmental abuses of power and other collective action problems in 
supplying global “aggregate public goods” requires mainstreaming human rights into the law of 
worldwide organizations so that worldwide rules and multilevel governance institutions can serve 
“constitutional functions” for transforming local and national into regional and worldwide public 
goods.
55
 Public goods theories emphasize the following two policy challenges: 
 First, multilateral agreements among states on “joint intergovernmental production” of public 
goods (e.g., in the context of an international organization or “networked cooperation”) are often 
preceded by bilateral “outward-oriented cooperation” (i.e., cooperation with others perceived as 
necessary to enjoy a public good domestically) and “inward-oriented cooperation”56 (i.e., global 
exigencies or regimes requiring national policy adjustments) based on conceptions of “common 
concerns” and “duties to protect”: How can multilateral principles and institutions promote legal 
criteria justifying unilateral protection of recognized “common concerns” in transnational 
relations (like the extension of the EU carbon-emission trading system to foreign airlines landing 
in the EU) so as to induce “free riders” to cooperate in providing global public goods? 
 Second, even though the non-rival nature of the benefits and provision of public goods may 
impede private initiatives for their production, such “market failures” can be corrected by 
government interventions assigning private actors, market mechanisms and “public-private 
                                                     
55
 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations “Global Compact” for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of 
Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621 (2002). 
56
 For explanations of the quoted terms, see Kaul et al., supra note 8, at 10 et seq. 
Constituting, Limiting, Regulating and Justifying Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods 
27 
partnerships” major roles in the collective supply of public goods (like reduction of GHG 
emissions, protection of biodiversity, promotion of public knowledge and freedom of 
information through the Internet).
57
 The role of private and public, national and international law 
for constituting, justifying, regulating and limiting the building blocks for public goods, 
designing legal incentives, constraining abuses of power, and allocating liabilities for harmful 
“externalities” needs to be further clarified with due regard to the human rights obligations of all 
UN member states. National governments are likely to remain the primary “duty bearers” for 
providing international public goods. Yet, effective supply of globally integrated public goods 
(like the international trading and environmental systems) requires multilevel governance 
reforms supported not only by states and intergovernmental organizations, but also by public-
private partnerships and “global citizens” empowered by cosmopolitan rights and judicial 
remedies enabling them to act as self-interested guardians of transnational rule of law. Empirical 
evidence (e.g., in European economic and human rights law) confirms that citizen-driven 
“struggles for rights,” judicial protection of cosmopolitan “access rights,” corresponding legal 
and judicial remedies and accountability of governments can set incentives for democratic 
support, production and consumption of public goods. 
The differences between national, regional and worldwide environmental regimes confirm that legal 
regulation of public goods may vary depending upon the regulatory problems, the legitimately diverse 
preferences of peoples, the distribution of related costs and benefits, and the legal traditions and 
strategies pursued by states. From the consumption perspective of citizens and people affected by 
global public goods (or “public bads”), human rights call for participatory and democratic decision-
making on the production of public goods and for their governance on the basis of rule of law. The 
“production process” of “aggregating” and transforming national into international public goods (like 
the world trading system) calls for extending market regulations and constitutional safeguards (like 
market access rights) across frontiers. Comparative legal analyses confirm that rule-making, rule 
implementation and “public reason” necessary for adjusting national and international legal regimes 
evolve differently in state-centred “Westphalian regimes” focusing on the rights and interests of the 
rulers (e.g., in limiting judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens) compared with cosmopolitan regimes 
protecting rights and interests of citizens (e.g., in holding governments accountable for violations of 
transnational rule of law). For instance, just as the UN Security Council has revised its “smart 
sanctions” against alleged terrorists and has enhanced “due process of law” in response to judicial 
challenges (e.g., by the EU Court of Justice), the multilevel judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights 
(e.g., by the EU and EFTA Courts of Justice) has enhanced transnational rule of law throughout the 
common market of the 30 EEA countries. The increasing “judicialization” of international economic 
and human rights law, and the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties and settling related 
disputes “in conformity with principles of justice” and human rights (as codified in the 1969 VCLT), 
confirm that mere state consent may no longer offer an adequate justification of government 
interferences (e.g., into economic and human rights) and of government refusal to protect international 
public goods. European integration law illustrates how—provided foreign policy discretion is 
constitutionally restrained—political governance failures in protecting transnational public goods may 
be limited by rights-based judicial procedures and principle-based, judicial rule-clarification for the 
benefit of citizens and their human and constitutional rights. 
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D. “Responsible Sovereignty” and “Common Concerns” May Justify Legal “Duties to Protect” 
The human rights of citizens entail “responsible sovereignty” requiring governments to respect, 
protect and fulfil human rights and related public goods, such as “sustainable development” as an 
explicit objective of UN law, WTO law and environmental law. As international law based upon 
territorial allocation of jurisdiction increasingly fails to properly address global challenges like 
protection of global public goods, the principle of common concern—as applied so far mainly in 
international environmental agreements (like the UNFCCC and the CBD) for promoting duties of 
cooperation—has the potential of redefining responsibilities of states vis-à-vis the production and 
administration of transnational public goods by creating legal and institutional incentives for 
international cooperation and justifying unilateral action protecting public goods vital to humankind.
58
 
According to Cottier, the “deep-seated perceptions of the exclusive domestic and territorial 
jurisdiction of States” and of their ineffective realpolitik are the main obstacle to more effective, 
multilevel governance of international public goods. In the absence of appropriate international 
institutional structures, global challenges—“in particular famine, genocide, other gross human rights 
violations and global warming,” but also other “vital interests to humankind”—require states to 
assume extraterritorial responsibilities in order to protect “common concerns” within and beyond their 
territorial jurisdictions. The “responsibility to protect” doctrine applied by the UN Security Council is 
an integral part of the emerging principle of common concern; but “the scope of Common Concern is 
still largely undefined” and depends upon interpreting positive law in conformity with common 
concerns (e.g., in WTO legal and dispute settlement practices regarding the labelling of products 
taking into account common health concerns). European integration law illustrates how combining 
unilateral “bottom up” with multilateral “top down” approaches can promote progress in developing 
international rules protecting common concerns of mankind and limiting unilateral, national measures 
with harmful externalities. 
“Responsible sovereignty” entails the risk that unilateral measures may undermine rather than protect 
international public goods and related “common concerns” (e.g., the US intervention in Iraq based on 
claims that UN inspectors had failed to protect the public good of preventing dictators from having 
weapons of mass destruction). It also requires clarifying the conditions under which procedurally 
illegal interventions (e.g., of NATO forces in Kosovo without prior authorization by the UN Security 
Council) may be justifiable in terms of preventing gross violations of human rights and related 
“common concerns.” Even if UN member states agree on “common concerns,” they may invoke their 
national sovereignty and the “safeguard clauses” in international agreements for protecting “national 
public interests” and prioritizing “common concerns” in diverse ways. Arguably, the antagonistic 
evolution of international protection of many global public goods is an inevitable consequence of the 
power-oriented, pluralist structures of the global system enabling unilateral definition of “national 
public interests” and invocation of related safeguard clauses; abuses of power can be limited best 
through progressive “constitutionalization” of international law, for instance by compulsory 
jurisdiction for the peaceful settlement of disputes over harmful externalities caused by “free riding,” 
distributive conflicts and illegitimate abuses of power among states. The EU’s decision to extend its 
carbon-emission trading system to international aviation from and to third countries offers an example 
which, even though legally contested by many third countries, could be justified by “common 
concerns” as being consistent with the EU’s worldwide obligations (e.g., under WTO law, the Chicago 
Convention on Civil Aviation, the UNFCC and its Kyoto Protocol) and bilateral treaties (e.g., the 
“open sky” agreements with the United States).59 
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E. Empowering Citizens and “Courts of Justice” as “Guardians of Public Goods”? 
Human rights require recognizing individual persons and their diverse ethical, moral, legal, democratic 
and cosmopolitan autonomies and responsibilities as constitutional foundations also of UN law and 
IEL in the 21st century. European integration suggests that “Westphalian agreements among sovereign 
states” (including the EEC Treaty of 1957) can protect international public goods more effectively by 
providing for cosmopolitan “access rights,” judicial guarantees of transnational rule of law for the 
benefit of citizens, and for “cosmopolitan democracy” promoting democratic discourse, community 
institutions, participatory, deliberative and representative democracy beyond nation states.
60
 Just as 
ever more UN member states have been transformed into constitutional democracies in response to 
human rights revolutions of their citizens, the international public goods of efficient markets and 
“sustainable development” must be protected by a “four-stage sequence” (John Rawls) of 
constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial protection of “access rights” to protection of 
non-discriminatory conditions of competition and other public goods. As global public goods affect all 
(including poor people), human rights and democracy require producing and protecting their benefits 
in participatory, fair, inclusive and rights-based ways. Modern economics and constitutional theories 
confirm that many public goods (like rule of law) depend primarily on legal empowerment and 
collective responsibility of citizens for institutionalizing reasonable rules. By focusing on “state 
sovereignty” rather than on “responsible popular sovereignty” and human rights, UN and WTO 
diplomats and politicians prioritize their self-interests (e.g., in redistributing domestic income by 
discriminatory trade restrictions, avoiding legal accountability vis-à-vis citizens for violations of 
international law) over the rights of citizens. 
European HRL and economic and environmental law illustrate that multilevel constitutional protection 
of cosmopolitan “access rights” to supply and consumption of transnational public goods can 
effectively limit the welfare-reducing “discriminatory traditions” of “constitutional nationalism” with 
due respect for the legitimate reality of “constitutional pluralism.” As “market failures” (like 
environmental pollution) and “governance failures” (like arbitrary violations of EU and WTO 
obligations ratified by national parliaments) are ultimately caused by individual conduct (e.g., of 
politicians) and organizations pursuing rational short-term self-interests at the expense of “reasonable 
common long-term interests” of citizens, the intermediate public good of transnational rule of law 
must be protected through constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial safeguards of 
individual “access rights” and other “countervailing restraints” limiting abuses of public and private 
power. Cosmopolitan rights set incentives for limiting the “rational ignorance” of many citizens vis-à-
vis transnational politics, such as Westphalian conceptions of “international law among sovereign 
states” treating citizens as mere objects of authoritarian “rule by law” based on authoritarian 
assumptions (e.g., of benevolent, omnipotent “sovereign rulers”) that are inconsistent with the human 
reality of ubiquituous conflicts of interests requiring governance “as closely as possible to the citizens” 
(subsidiarity principle). Mutual coherence of national and international legal regimes requires 
multilevel constitutional protection of constitutional and cosmopolitan rights of citizens. Just as 
economic markets can function efficiently only in a framework of common market and competition 
rules protecting equal rights of citizens (e.g., in their multiple roles as producers, workers, investors, 
traders and consumers), so can “political markets” and multilevel governance avoid abuses of power 
and other “governance failures” only in a framework of “countervailing rights” of citizens and judicial 
“checks and balances.” Paradoxically, the more complex multilevel economic and environmental 
regimes become, the stronger is the need for decentralized, cosmopolitan rule-of-law systems 
empowering private stakeholders to defend their rights to transnational rule of law. For instance, rather 
than transforming trade and investment disputes of private economic actors into international disputes 
among states in the ICJ or in WTO dispute settlement bodies, such “medieval politicization” of 
economic disputes and related “trade wars” can often be avoided by decentralizing and depoliticizing 
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trade and investment disputes following the model of European economic law empowering citizens to 
enforce common market, competition, environmental rules and human rights directly in domestic 
courts and arbitration. As human rights also protect individual and democratic diversity (e.g., diverse 
preferences for public goods, diverse traditions of majoritarian democracy), jurisdiction gaps, 
governance gaps, incentive gaps, participation gaps and rule-of-law gaps in multilevel governance of 
interdependent public goods may be inevitable;
61
 the peaceful resolution of the resulting conflicts has 
to be allocated not only to political but also to judicial institutions protecting cosmopolitan rights, 
judicial remedies and respect for legitimate “constitutional pluralism.” The diverse conceptions of IEL 
as (1) “international law among sovereign states,” (2) global administrative law, (3) multilevel 
economic regulation, (4) international “conflicts law” or (5) multilevel constitutional law62 must be 
integrated by recognizing citizens as “democratic principals” vis-à-vis national and international 
governance institutions as agents with limited powers, whose legitimacy derives from protecting 
constitutional and cosmopolitan rights and rule of law. The EEA Agreement, or the “Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters,” offer practical examples of successful “constitutionalization” of 
international public goods for the benefit of citizens among states with diverse constitutional 
traditions. 
F. Respect for “Constitutional Pluralism” and Its Limits 
The need for respecting “constitutional pluralism” and deliberative democracy entails that limiting 
“nationalist biases” against protecting international public goods by means of stronger cosmopolitan 
rights and “cosmopolitan democracy” (e.g., by recognizing “UN citizenship rights” similar to EU 
citizenship rights) will often take a long time. “Sovereign equality of states” and “constitutional 
pluralism” will remain foundational principles of international law in the 21st century. “Sovereign 
equality of states” is not only a “Westphalian principle” but, if interpreted as “responsible 
sovereignty,” also a requirement of democratic responsibility to institutionalize “reasonable rules” 
empowering people to protect human rights and other public goods responding to the preferences of 
the people. The diverse democratic and “constitutional paradigms” practiced by UN member states—
such as (1) rights-based constitutional democracies (e.g., in the 30 EEA countries), (2) 
“communitarian democracies” focusing on “parliamentary sovereignty” or “majority regulation” of the 
economy (e.g., in many Anglo-Saxon democracies), and (3) “authoritarian decent states” (e.g., as 
described in Rawls’s Theory of Justice) with non-liberal constitutions—are part of the reality of 
“constitutional pluralism.” Each of these diverse constitutional paradigms is related to competing 
conceptions of human rights and competing “foreign policy paradigms” (e.g., rights-based common 
market regulation across Europe, intergovernmental regulation of free trade areas outside Europe). 
Respect for “reasonable disagreements” and “constitutional pluralism” at national levels are not 
inconsistent with cosmopolitan conceptions of IEL in regional economic communities and in the 
global division of labour. Economists, political scientists, lawyers and diplomats often disagree with 
cosmopolitan conceptions of IEL: 
 Economists prefer parsimonious models facilitating mathematical predictions, and rarely apply 
“constitutional economics” to international relations. Even if economists acknowledge that the 
economic goal of maximizing consumer welfare could be promoted by recognizing individual 
“market freedoms” (as proposed by ordo-liberalism and “constitutional economics”), economic 
freedom as a utilitarian or constitutional value has to be reconciled with other constitutional 
values as decided by national parliaments (e.g., in order to protect a “conservative welfare 
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function” avoiding “serious injury” to import-competing producers).63 The failure to conclude 
the Doha Round negotiations illustrates that—without reciprocity of intergovernmental “market 
access commitments”—trade liberalization and trade regulation (such as the draft Agreement on 
Trade Facilitation) risk lacking political support. 
 Political scientists acknowledge that—in the multilevel supply of ever more public goods—the 
“disaggregated state” cooperating through ever more international organizations and 
intergovernmental networks tends to protect consumer welfare and other public goods more 
effectively than traditional “Westphalian conceptions” of discretionary foreign policy. Yet, as 
explained by “public choice theory,” governments pursue self-interests in insisting on 
discretionary policy powers and in resisting legal and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens in 
international economic relations. This reality of “member-driven governance” in international 
organizations prompts “realist political scientists” to perceive “cosmopolitan reforms” of UN 
and WTO law as utopian, especially inside nation states dominated by interest group politics 
(e.g., in the US Congress) and by executive foreign policy discretion (e.g., in hegemonic 
countries). 
 International lawyers and legal advisors of governments justify state-centred conceptions of 
international law by the “democratic gate-keeper” function of national parliaments to decide on 
domestic implementation of intergovernmental commitments requiring states to comply with 
certain agreed results without limiting national sovereignty to choose the most appropriate 
instruments for domestic implementation of international obligations. The NAFTA countries, for 
example, claim that the “constitutional problems” of democratic constitution, justification, 
limited delegation, separation and restriction of multilevel governance can be resolved in the 
context of national constitutionalism (e.g., by constitutional restraints on delegation of powers to 
international organizations) without requiring an integrated theory of multilevel 
constitutionalism on protection of public goods and cosmopolitan rights across national frontiers. 
Yet, the weak institutional structures of NAFTA and the breakdown of the intergovernmental 
NAFTA dispute settlement procedures (e.g., due to refusal by the United States to submit to 
Chapter 20 NAFTA dispute settlement panels) confirm the experience of other regional free 
trade areas dominated by “hegemonic countries” (like SADEC dominated by South Africa, 
MERCOSUR dominated by Argentina and Brazil) that transnational rule of law cannot be 
effectively protected if governments insist on “Westphalian freedom” to violate international 
rules. 
European citizens—by limiting multilevel governance in the EU, the EEA as well as in the ECHR by 
constitutional, legislative, executive and judicial “institutionalization of public reason” and multilevel 
judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights—have secured more regional public goods and 
constitutional rights than they had ever enjoyed before. Also European “majoritarian democracies” 
(e.g., Anglo-Saxon democracies) have accepted multilevel limitations of “parliamentary freedom” and 
majority politics in favour of rights-based conceptions of cosmopolitan self-government of citizens 
(e.g., in the common market among the 30 EEA countries). The financial crises in the United States 
and Europe have prompted additional financial regulation at national and European levels based on 
protection of cosmopolitan rights and consumer protection (e.g., principles of transparency, 
accountability, access to information and to judicial remedies). Just as the “2011 Arab Spring” 
confirmed the historical experience of earlier (e.g., American and French) “human rights revolutions” 
that citizens have to struggle for human rights and other public goods (like constitutional democracy), 
transforming Westphalian “international law among states” into cosmopolitan IEL requires legal and 
judicial struggles by citizens for their cosmopolitan rights. The progressive transformation of 
international human rights and investment law through multilevel judicial protection of human and 
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economic rights confirms that cosmopolitan “access rights” and transnational judicial remedies are 
normatively justifiable, politically feasible, and capable of promoting non-discriminatory supply and 
consumption of transnational public goods. 
G. Constitutional Problems of Constructing Transnational Regulatory Communities 
Reconciling the competing economic, political, legal and constitutional conceptions of “public goods” 
and of “international law” calls for promoting “cosmopolitan public reason” mobilizing citizens to 
assert “democratic ownership” for constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying multilevel political, 
legal and judicial governance of “aggregate public goods.” Theories of justice, human rights and 
constitutional law require justifying governance for public goods in terms of “principles of justice,” 
including judicial remedies by “courts of justice.” Arguably, the universal human rights obligations of 
UN member states, the related requirement of a “four-stage sequence” of constitutional, legislative, 
executive and judicial protection of public goods, and the need for governing interdependent public 
goods with due respect for legitimate “constitutional pluralism” at national and international levels are 
“constitutional building-blocks” for democratic, multilevel governance of international public goods in 
the 21st century. The “human condition” of ubiquitous conflicts of interests (e.g., between diverse 
ethical conceptions for a “good life,” emotions, rational egoism and limited reasonableness inside 
human minds) and related abuses of power remain the central “constitutional challenge” requiring 
“constitutionalization” of all human interactions at national, transnational and international levels. 
Whereas “constitutionalization” of national legal systems inside historically grown nation states and 
communities often succeeded through human rights revolutions and civil wars, “constitutionalizing” 
international law can succeed peacefully only through deliberative and participatory democracy, 
“cosmopolitan re-interpretations” and constitutional protection (e.g., by national and international 
courts) of the “principles of justice” underlying UN law, WTO law and multilevel HRL, such as 
multilevel guarantees of equal freedoms and multilevel judicial protection of transnational rule of law, 
democratic rights and obligations to protect human rights and other public goods. 
It remains an open question whether mankind will be capable to institutionalize “public reason” 
enabling human beings to constitute, limit, regulate and justify multilevel governance of 
interdependent public goods more effectively in the 21st century. As human rights also protect 
individual and democratic diversity (such as legitimately diverse conceptions of a “good life” and 
“social justice”), national and cosmopolitan constitutionalism must be coordinated on the basis of 
respect for legitimate “constitutional pluralism” and “subsidiarity.” The hundreds of national 
constitutional regimes and regional and worldwide treaty regimes for protecting public goods, like the 
ubiquity of “governance failures” in coordinating national and international public goods and 
regulating their “horizontal” as well as “vertical interdependencies,” offer a vast field for empirical 
and comparative research on interdependent public goods. The more economic and environmental 
resources are becoming scarce in relation to the expanding recognition of civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural human rights and cosmopolitan and democratic demands of citizens, the more 
important becomes justifying public goods regimes not only in terms of procedural fairness and “due 
process of law,” but also in terms of distributive justice and cosmopolitan rights of citizens.64 
Cosmopolitan “access rights” and judicial remedies are necessary not only as “external limitations” of 
abuses of national governance powers by holding governments accountable for protecting individual 
autonomy, limiting welfare-reducing border discrimination, and protecting public goods and market-
driven use of decentralized knowledge of citizens that “Westphalian rulers” inevitably lack. They are 
even more necessary as reciprocal, “reasonable self-commitments” of citizens enabling, promoting 
and limiting mutually beneficial cooperation across frontiers based on rules that are recognized and 
supported as promoting fairness and justice. 
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H. The Laboratory of Regional Law: The Eurozone as a White Elephant? 
Rights-based European constitutional democracies often perceive EU law, EEA law, the ECHR and 
EFTA law and jurisprudence as advanced laboratories for designing more “democratic international 
law” protecting international public goods more effectively for the benefit of citizens. European legal 
doctrine and judicial methodologies (such as “proportionality balancing” of economic and human 
rights) challenge the neglect of human and constitutional rights by “Westphalian legal regimes” as 
well as by Anglo-Saxon “common law” traditions.65 European integration law increasingly influences 
legal and judicial attempts in jurisdictions beyond Europe to limit abuses of public and private power. 
Yet, as illustrated by the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 3 February 2012 and by 
numerous WTO dispute settlement findings against EU regulations, European “transnational legal 
innovations” also provoke adverse responses aimed at limiting abuses of power inside Europe.66 The 
incomplete regulation and supervision of the persistent violations of the EU treaty disciplines for 
national fiscal and debt policies (e.g., as defined in Article 126 TFEU and Protocol No. 12 on the 
excessive deficit procedure) by most of the 17 Eurozone member states have entailed economic, social 
and legal crises undermining the legitimacy of multilevel governance in the Eurozone. It remains 
uncertain whether the new EU regulations, directives and treaties among Eurozone members aimed at 
strengthening fiscal, debt and economic governance can realize their declared goal of “stronger 
national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies” so as to prevent private and public debt 
defaults and other breaches of the law.
67
 Without more economic growth, the European “social model” 
risks becoming unsustainable. Just as multilevel governance conceptions of “European public goods” 
remain contested, the multilevel governance regimes in regional economic agreements in Africa, Asia 
and the Americas require constant “balancing” and re-adjustment of national, regional and worldwide 
regulation and judicial review of claims to unilaterally protect public goods across frontiers (e.g., by 
border carbon tax adjustments, extension of carbon-emission trading to third countries). It is this 
antagonistic disorder of individual, national, bilateral and regional “trial and error” that may ultimately 
promote a new “public reason” enabling more coherent multilevel governance and regulation of public 
goods. As emphasized also in Francis Fukuyama’s recent book The Origins of Political Order,68 the 
promotion of transnational rule-of-law systems is likely to be of crucial importance for more effective, 
multilevel governance of interdependent “aggregate public goods.” If, as suggested by Albert Einstein, 
madness is characterized by repeating the same method time and again in the hope of producing a 
different outcome, the 21st century requires moving away from “Westphalian power politics” as the 
prevailing governance paradigm in UN and WTO institutions for the collective protection of global 
public goods. 
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VI. Methodological Problems of International Public Goods Research 
In order to contain the “arrogance of power” and interest group politics dominating the Westphalian 
system of international law, there is an obvious need for promoting education, research and innovation 
on multilevel governance and related theories of interdependent public goods. 
A. Need for “Democratic Leadership” 
Following the “Atlantic Charter” of 1941, the United States initiated a historically unique “global 
leadership” for reconstructing a liberal (i.e., liberty-based) international order by preparing drafts and 
convening international conferences on, inter alia, the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreements, the 1945 UN 
Charter, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) and the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, i.e., the multilateral legal and treaty foundations of the post-war 
international legal, political and economic order promoting 65 years of peaceful international 
cooperation. Such “hegemonic leadership” cannot be repeated in the 21st century, for instance because 
the US acceptance of the Bretton Woods Agreements, the UN Charter and of GATT 1947 was 
conditional on “veto rights” which the United States could exercise in the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the UN Security Council and in GATT/WTO rule-making based on consensus procedures. As the 
necessary “constitutionalization” and “civilization” of international public goods regimes in the 21st 
century must be justified, legitimized and “decentralized” in terms of human and other cosmopolitan 
rights and “principles of justice,” the necessary leadership must come from democratic countries in the 
form of bilateral, regional and plurilateral agreements (e.g., pursuant to Article II:3 WTO Agreement, 
Article XXIV GATT, Article V GATS) insisting on “human rights coherence” and on respect for 
legitimate “constitutional pluralism” of international public goods regimes. This normative premise is 
in conformity with the increasing practice of negotiating bilateral, regional and plurilateral economic 
and environmental agreements in order to circumvent the consensus principles impeding the 
conclusion of new worldwide public goods regimes in UN institutions and the WTO. 
B. Human Rights, “Principles of Justice” and “Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism” Offer Common 
Legal Methodologies for Diverse Public Goods Regimes 
Inside nation states, the universal recognition of human rights calls for participatory, deliberative and 
representative forms of democratic self-governance; yet, the law and institutions of national 
democracies and of their collective supply of national public goods tend to differ from country to 
country. This contribution perceived protection of equal freedoms and corresponding, constitutional 
rights and obligations of justifying governmental restrictions of equal freedoms as a “first principle of 
justice,” including respect for the legitimate diversity of such democratic and judicial justifications 
“balancing” civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and other public goods at national and 
international levels. European integration illustrates the inevitable “democratic deficit” of 
supranational governance beyond national people constituting a “demos” that remains committed to 
preserving its “unity in diversity” in international cooperation: neither the representation of the 27 
national “peoples” in the EU institutions nor the EU citizen rights of 500 million EU citizens aim at 
creating a single “European people” with a single “democratic space” constituting a single European 
identity based on Europe-wide democratic discourse of EU citizens legitimating EU legislation and 
decision-making directly at the EU level. As the powers of international organizations (including the 
EU) remain limited compared with national parliamentary powers (e.g., to tax citizens, to legislate and 
enforce law by means of coercion), most EU citizens continue to view the EU as a functionally 
limited, regulatory regime, whose democratic legitimacy depends on delegation and control by 
national parliaments and constitutional courts of justice. Beyond the unique multilevel governance 
system of the EU, most national parliaments do not effectively control the dynamic evolution of 
worldwide treaty regimes, notwithstanding certain attempts at promoting transnational consultative, 
parliamentary institutions in some UN agencies, the WTO and regional agreements. In view of the 
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“enabling, limiting and supplementing functions” of international organization to enable collective 
supply of international public goods by limiting national governance failures and supplementing 
“incomplete national legal systems,” the legitimacy of international public goods regimes must be 
constituted, limited, regulated and justified not only in terms of national parliamentary democracy, but 
also by protection of human rights and other “principles of justice” in the transnational cooperation 
among citizens for the collective supply of international public goods.
69
 By recognizing citizens and 
democratic “people” as “primary sovereigns” also of international public goods regimes, 
“cosmopolitan constitutionalism” and international law and institutions are necessary complements of 
national legal systems for the collective supply of public goods. 
As human rights and cosmopolitan constitutionalism aim at protecting individual and popular 
diversity, they make it possible to share a common legal methodology for international public goods 
regimes with due respect for the legitimate diversity of national constitutional, legal and political 
regimes and conceptions for a “good life” and “political justice.”70 As emphasized in the UN Charter 
(e.g., Article 1) and numerous other treaties, “international disputes should be settled by peaceful 
means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,” including “human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all” (Preamble VCLT). The UN Charter provisions on the International 
Court of Justice (e.g., Article 38 ICJ Statute) codify the sources of international law (e.g., international 
conventions, custom, general principles of law) and the “rules of recognition” (e.g., recognition by 
states, “civilized nations,” “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists”) not only in terms of state consent, but also in terms of “civilized nations,” judicial 
decisions and “public reason” of citizens and public discourse, thereby providing not only for 
“conservative justice” (e.g., in terms of rule-following) but also for “reformative justice” (e.g., in 
terms of distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity as defined by human rights 
jurisprudence). Following the ancient European law traditions of defining law as “participation in the 
idea of justice” and conceiving “justice as a prerequisite to living a civic life, to living in community” 
(Plato),
71
 international law and public goods regimes must remain justifiable in terms of justice, 
human rights and democratic self-government in the 21st century, with due respect for the diverse 
“contexts of justice” (e.g., at national, cosmopolitan and international levels) and for the legitimately 
diverse conceptions of HRL at national, regional and worldwide levels of regulation. In contrast to 
“Westphalian discourse” focusing on rights and obligations of states and democratic discourse 
focusing on parliamentary democracies, cosmopolitan discourse and transnational justice centre on 
different dimensions of human autonomy, popular self-determination and cosmopolitan rights.
72
 Yet, 
even though the UN Charter and the law of many other international organizations explicitly refer to 
“principles of justice,” cosmopolitan conceptions of “global justice” and of an international “law of 
peoples” remain disputed.73 European courts and the ICJ refer regularly to requirements of “proper 
administration of justice” in clarifying procedural principles of due process of law and substantive 
principles of justice. The ICJ, for instance, takes it for granted that: 
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Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and 
therefore in that sense equitable.”74 “Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of 
justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it.”75 
Yet, “reasonable disagreement” among citizens and governments over the interpretation of human 
rights and other “principles of justice” is likely to remain a permanent reality in view of legitimately 
diverse conceptions for a “good life,” diverse communitarian and democratic preferences, legal 
traditions and “constitutional pluralism” in the 193 UN member states.76 
C. Legal Positivism and Legal Pluralism 
In view of the limited mandates of (inter)national courts deciding disputes on the basis of the 
applicable rules of law and the customary methods of textual, contextual and functional treaty 
interpretation (cf. Articles 31–33 VCLT), legal positivism has become the generally accepted starting 
point in interpreting and developing legal regimes. Legal systems are perceived as a union of “primary 
rules of conduct” and “secondary rules” of recognition, change and adjudication77 that dynamically 
interact with changing legal practices by private and public legal actors, who often justify legal claims 
and interpretations of rules by invoking legal principles.
78
 Hart claimed that international law 
“resembles, ( . . . ) in form though not at all in content, a simple regime of primary or customary law” 
and, due to its incomplete “secondary rules,” a “primitive legal order.”79 Yet, in contrast to other areas 
of international law where third-party adjudication remains an exception to the rule of “auto-
interpretation,” regional HRL and IEL are today characterized by an ever stronger role of national and 
international courts in clarifying, progressively developing and enforcing transnational rule of law, 
thereby transforming regional HRL and IEL into more developed legal systems than other areas of the 
Westphalian “international law among sovereign states.” The distinction between “international public 
law among states” (considering states as exclusive subjects and objects of international law) and 
“international private law” (based on national choice-of-law rules) is increasingly blurred by the 
emergence of “transnational legal systems” recognizing individuals as legal subjects deriving 
individual rights from international agreements (e.g., on human rights, investment and intellectual 
property law, regional economic and environmental agreements) and creating autonomous, de-
nationalised legal systems (like lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex digitalis of the Internet).
80
 The new 
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“legal pluralism” based on functional rather than territorial legal sub-systems (e.g., WTO membership 
admitting not only states but also sub- and supranational customs territories like Hong Kong and the 
EU) entails conflicts of jurisdiction challenging the boundaries and cultures of national, transnational 
and international legal and judicial systems and related legal pre-conceptions (Vorverständnis) of legal 
actors.
81
 The diplomatic focus on “member-driven governance” (e.g., in WTO law) illustrates that 
“legal pluralism,” European perceptions of independent and impartial judges as the primary paradigm 
of justice and of authoritative interpretation of law, individual rights and judicial remedies of “market 
citizens” and other non-governmental economic actors enforcing IEL as “private attorneys general” 
remain contested by “realist claims” of intergovernmental power politics. European legal research is 
characterized by continuous attempts at integrating positive law, empirical, normative and moral 
dimensions of legal integration. Yet, it remains controversial also in European integration law to what 
extent cosmopolitan rights and individual access to justice should be protected (e.g., in the foreign 
policy area), and whether “European law” should be conceived as one single legal system (e.g., a 
“Union based on the rule of law” including EU law and the national legal systems of the 27 EU 
member states) or as a “multilevel, composite system” composed of diverse, national and international 
legal orders, which often serve as “laboratories” for progressively improving European economic law. 
D. “Dual Nature” and Policy Conceptions of Legal Systems 
Legal positivism and textual interpretations of rules often leave open normative questions. Due to the 
worldwide recognition—in more than one hundred UN human rights instruments—of “inalienable” 
human rights obligating all UN member states to respect, protect and promote human rights, natural 
law theory has become an integral part of positive international law; it may be relevant for 
interpreting, e.g., the systemic nature of human rights (e.g., as legal rights derived from moral 
principles and political procedures),
82
 the relationships between “rules” and “principles” in human 
rights law and IEL, the legal clarification of “common, but differentiated responsibilities” in 
international environmental law, and the need for respecting the diverse preferences of human beings 
and their diverse, democratic governance systems. The human rights jurisprudence of European courts 
confirms that the recognition of jus cogens and of other legal hierarchies (e.g., of constitutional over 
legislative and administrative rules) may justify judicial findings that unjust rules (e.g., “smart 
economic sanctions” by the UN Security Council disregarding human rights) may not be a valid part 
of positive European law. The legal “validity” of legal rules has to be identified, inter alia, by the 
criteria provided in the “rules of recognition” and their interpretation by citizens, governments and 
courts. In the absence of clear legal hierarchies among competing functional and regional legal 
regimes, their diverse legal obligations need to be mutually reconciled through ‘consistent 
interpretation’ (cf. Article 31 VCLT) and adjudication. In constitutional democracies, the multilevel 
human rights obligations of states constitutionally limit the “rules of recognition” by permitting 
recognition of only such rules and institutions as legitimate and legally valid that respect constitutional 
rights and “principles of justice” as defined in democratic law-making and judicial proceedings.83 
Diplomats interested in maintaining their foreign policy discretion often dislike this “dual nature” of 
modern legal systems—i.e., as positive law (e.g., represented by authoritative issuance and social 
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efficacy of rules) as well as “inalienable” human rights and open-ended “principles of justice,” which 
can be of crucial importance for legal interpretation and dispute settlement.
84
 
Legal analyses of international public goods regimes tend to share the positivist legal premises that 
positive law must be distinguished from normative proposals for changing the existing rules; positive 
law must therefore also remain separable from moral principles that have not been incorporated into 
positive law; and the efficacy of legal systems requires that “primary rules” of conduct and “secondary 
rules” of recognition, change and adjudication must be established as “social facts” reflected in social 
practices and sources of law. Yet, as illustrated by European economic law, transforming “anarchy” 
into “constitutional order” in international economic relations may require going beyond legal 
analyses of positive IEL by challenging authoritarian normative legal doctrines (e.g., concerning state 
sovereignty) through re-interpreting international rules in conformity with the human rights 
obligations of states and their underlying “constitutional principles” (e.g., popular sovereignty 
entailing “duties to protect” and “responsible sovereignty”). As Albert Einstein famously remarked: 
“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” The 
“New Haven School”’s conception of international law as a “constitutive process of authoritative 
decision-making” by individuals and democratic constituencies85 explains why jurisprudence is also 
about making and developing international law through reasonable policy choices protecting human 
rights, democratic self-governance and a just social order. The less the “IEL in the books” succeeds in 
realizing its development objectives, the stronger becomes the need for reviewing the “IEL in action” 
from the diverse legal and policy perspectives of the various actors like individuals, firms, 
parliaments, intergovernmental law-makers, national and international administrators, diplomats and 
judges. Normative legal and constitutional theory concentrates on the reasonable relationships between 
legal principles, rules and institutions and on their diverse perceptions depending on the “observational 
standpoint” (e.g., of diplomats, parliaments, international judges, impartial and reasonable citizens, 
non-governmental civil society organizations). The needed policy-oriented legal analysis must also 
take into account the social, economic and political conditions necessary for realizing legal and 
constitutional policy objectives. As customary international law requires settling international disputes 
in conformity with principles of justice and the human rights obligations of states, textual, systemic 
and functional interpretation of rules—with due regard to relevant legal principles and human rights 
obligations of states—should be as transparent as possible in order to be persuasive and promote 
inclusive “public reason” and critical review. Yet, this function of courts as “exemplars of public 
reason” (John Rawls) may conflict with their specific dispute settlement function in jurisdictions (like 
GATT 1947 and the WTO) depending on voluntary acceptance and implementation of dispute 
settlement findings by governments with political self-interests in confidential dispute settlements. 
Different legal actors (e.g., law-makers, judges, commercial arbitrators, policy-makers) are likely to 
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perceive, use and evaluate legal rules, democratic and dispute settlement procedures, and legal 
methodologies from different perspectives. 
Many past doctrinal disputes among “legal positivists,” “natural rights theorists” and social 
conceptions of law—for instance, whether positive law includes only “rules” or also “principles” of 
law, and whether judges enjoy discretion in the absence of applicable rules—have become outdated: 
“general principles of law” are today universally recognized sources of international law (see Article 
38 ICJ Statute); almost all international courts acknowledge today that, in disputes over the contested 
meaning of imprecise rules, judges must find the “right answer” through “administration of justice,” 
the customary methods of legal interpretation and “balancing” of rules in the light of applicable 
principles, rules and procedures, including democratic and judicial clarifications and justifications of 
rules.
86
 WTO dispute settlement bodies, investor-state arbitration and other economic courts often 
have good reasons to pragmatically avoid controversial questions about justice in IEL, for instance in 
the WTO dispute over differential, yet “non-discriminatory” treatment of less-developed countries 
benefitting from the Generalized System of Trade Preferences, or in WTO dispute settlement rulings 
on the requirement of “fair price comparisons” in anti-dumping investigations.87 The options of “exit, 
voice and loyalty” may be used not only for explaining the dynamic evolution of regional economic 
law;
88
 they also influence the decreasing loyalty to the post-war IEL system (as illustrated by the 
termination of GATT 1947 in 1995, recourse to regional trade agreements as alternatives to 
concluding the WTO Doha Round negotiations) and the often antagonistic recourse to “legal 
pluralism” in IEL (as illustrated by ever more bilateral agreements on investments, movements of 
natural persons, energy supply, double taxation, intellectual property rights) as well as to unilateralism 
(e.g., the EU’s extension of its carbon-emission trading system to flights from and to third countries). 
Designing and evaluating decentralized legal reforms—especially if they are aimed at protecting 
international public goods more effectively by “moving from the world of Hobbes to the world of 
Kant”89—may require interdisciplinary analysis of law justifying legal interpretations in terms of 
“responsible sovereignty” and “duties to protect” internationally agreed “common interests” across 
frontiers for the benefit of citizens and their human rights. 
E. International Public Goods Require Interdisciplinary Research 
International relations theories focusing on states (like realism, institutionalism, functionalism) or also 
on individual and non-governmental actors (like “public choice” and constitutional theories) try to 
explain the rational choices of political actors rather than “legal methodologies” (e.g., for interpreting 
legal rules). Many “realist” claims (e.g., that political morality does not reach beyond national legal 
                                                     
86
 On the increasing resort—in international human rights law, labour law, trade and investment law and adjudication—to 
“principle-oriented” interpretations and adjudication, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Judging Judges: From “Principal-
Agent Theory” to “Constitutional Justice” in Multilevel Judicial Governance of Economic Cooperation among Citizens, 
11 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 827 (2008). On legal “interpretivism” treating law as an interpretive 
concept based not only on rules but also on justifying principles (like justice, liberty, equality, democracy) requiring “just 
interpretation” of law, see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011), chapter 19. 
87
 For a discussion, see, e.g., ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (2009), at 248 
et seq., 261 et seq., 314 et seq. 
88
 See Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2403 (1990), explaining constitutional and 
economic law reforms in the EU by their dependence on a political equilibrium between “voice, exit and loyalty” (see 
ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY—RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 
(1970)). On older, ordo-liberal conceptions of “interdependence of legal, economic and political orders,” on the risk of 
“social dis-embedding” by globalization, and the need for “democratic re-embedding of IEL” through stronger protection 
of human rights and “struggles for individual rights,” see PETERSMANN, supra note 1, chapters IV and VII. 
89
 See Pascal Lamy, who—in his speech of 6 October 2011 on What Multilateral Trading System for the Future? (accessible 
on the WTO website)—stated: “we need to do for international monetary relations what we already did for trade: move 
from the world of Hobbes towards the world of Kant.” 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
40 
systems) are empirically inconsistent with the increasing impact of international law, international 
regulatory agencies and of multilevel adjudication on social and legal practices. “Realist neglect” of 
international law as the most important instrument for constructing international “aggregate public 
goods” all too often reflects ignorance or “capture” of regulators by powerful lobbies benefitting from 
interest group politics at the expense of “rationally ignorant consumers.” Economic analysis of law 
may be important not only for understanding “economic structures” of private and public law90 but 
also for interpreting legal rules based on principles of economics.
91
 Political theories of justice and 
other legal philosophies may be of direct, normative relevance for the interpretation of rules and the 
legal design of institutions, for instance by justifying inherent powers of “courts of justice” and respect 
for “reasonable disagreement” among citizens and polities. Yet, as illustrated by the failures of 
economics to predict the global financial crises since 2008, the numerous “market failures” (like 
information asymmetries, lack of transparency, non-accountability of abuses of power) prompt ever 
more economists to call for “a new economic paradigm” (Joseph Stiglitz).92 From the point of view of 
theories of justice, equal freedoms (as “first principle of justice”) and the human capacity of 
reasonable autonomy (as recognized in numerous human rights instruments like Article 1 UDHR) 
require justification of all governmental restrictions of equal freedoms through legal 
“institutionalization of public reason” based not only on fair procedures (e.g., deliberative and 
parliamentary democracy, impartial adjudication, “balancing” of competing civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural human rights). HRL and IEL are also influenced by substantive “principles of 
justice” (e.g., in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), institutional “checks and balances” (like 
“courts of justice”) and other legal safeguards protecting “sovereign equality of states,” “reasonable 
disagreement” and the reality of “constitutional pluralism” (e.g., among constitutional, majoritarian 
and non-liberal democracies). 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of law as an instrument of social governance depend on the social 
acceptance, democratic support and legal practices not only by government agents but also by citizens 
(as “democratic principals”). Hence, law has to be analysed with due regard to its social context and 
legal practices. The context of IEL—for instance, regarding multilevel judicial protection of 
cosmopolitan rights (like trading and investor rights, intellectual property and labour rights, access to 
justice)—differs from the context and functions of other fields like human rights and international 
criminal law. For instance: 
 in order to protect freedom of contract and reduce transaction costs for the billions of producers, 
investors, traders and consumers participating in the worldwide division of labour, IEL relies 
more on decentralized, market-driven information-, coordination-, steering- and sanctioning-
mechanisms as well as on cosmopolitan rights (e.g., in commercial, trade, investment, 
intellectual property, labour, economic integration law and arbitration) than most other fields of 
international cooperation and regulation; 
 the current European private and sovereign debt crises illustrate the strong interdependencies 
between national, regional and worldwide market regulations; inadequate regulation of profit-
driven “market forces” (e.g., in globally integrated financial markets) can entail systemic 
violations of rule of law by private and public actors (e.g., defaulting on their contractual debt 
obligations); 
 the large number of private and public, (sub)national and international actors participating in the 
legal regulation (e.g., of more than half of world trade taking place inside and among some 
80,000 transnational corporations with 10 times as many subsidiaries) illustrates the need for 
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transnational rule of law protecting not only rights of governments, but also the rights of citizens 
and other economic actors; 
 IEL provides for more “international rule-of-law institutions” (such as multilevel regulatory and 
judicial authorities, quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures, supervision by international 
organizations) for international rule-making and dispute settlement than other fields of 
international law; yet, the prevailing “Westphalian conceptions” of “international law among 
sovereign states” offer citizens no effective legal and judicial remedies against welfare-reducing 
violations of UN and WTO law; 
 compulsory jurisdiction and jurisprudence of international dispute settlement bodies in IEL (e.g., 
in the WTO, regional trade courts, treaty-based or commercial investor-state arbitration) tend to 
be more frequently invoked and legally more developed (e.g., in terms of “balancing” of public 
and private rights and interests) than in most other areas of international relations; hence, the 
more citizens participate in transnational governance and adjudication as “global citizens” and 
insist on supply of global public goods, the more citizens have reasons to claim cosmopolitan 
rights and democratic ownership of transnational governance institutions. 
F. International Adjudication Must Take into Account the Diverse “Contexts of Justice” 
“Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.”93 In contrast to the 
search for truth in the natural sciences, the justification of law and jurisprudence (e.g., in the sense of 
the right application of the law on the basis of objective criteria) are often less about “truth” (e.g., in 
case of establishing legal facts) than—notably in case of normative decisions—about 
“institutionalizing public reason” providing for “reasonable procedures” of rule-making, rule-
administration and rule-enforcement based on “balanced judgments” (e.g., resulting from democratic 
discourse among free and equal citizens, representative parliamentary decision-making, judicial 
procedures administered by impartial and independent judges so as to secure “rule of law,” 
“balancing” among competing human and constitutional rights based on principles of non-
discrimination, necessity and proportionality). Arguably, reasonable judgments and justice (e.g., in the 
sense of reasonable justification) are the equivalent in normative social sciences to truth in the natural 
sciences.
94
 Access to justice and judicial “administration of justice” are necessary “constitutional 
building blocks” of the multilevel governance structures through which citizens, people and states seek 
to deliver public goods.
95
 Both legal theory and practice suggest that multilevel judicial protection of 
transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens—e.g., by limiting power-oriented claims of 
government executives to freely violate international guarantees of equal freedoms, non-
discrimination and rule of law in order to protect domestic interest groups in exchange for their 
political support—are necessary for protecting transnational public goods more effectively; just as 
national constitutional courts have to protect agreed “principles of justice” and “the higher law” 
against abuses of power inside states, international courts have to protect international public goods 
against abuses of powers in transnational relations. 
Questions of justice arise from social conflicts, for instance whenever citizens claim conflicting rights 
or request the elimination of arbitrary distinctions and the fair settlement of their disputes on the basis 
of “just principles” and “fair procedures” reviewing and “balancing” the competing claims and 
justifying the final judgment. The need for peaceful settlement of disputes over conflicting claims for 
justice, for judicial protection of transnational rule of law and judicial remedies based on principles of 
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justice is today more recognized in IEL than in most UN public goods regimes. Since Aristotle, 
distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity continue to be recognized as important 
“spheres of justice” in the design of dispute settlement systems (e.g., for “violation complaints,” “non-
violation complaints” and “situation complaints” pursuant to GATT Article XXIII); post-colonial IEL 
also includes “principles of transitional justice” (e.g., in Part IV of GATT and in the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding of the WTO). This contribution has argued that “Westphalian focus” on 
rights and obligations of states and lack of adequate rights and judicial remedies of individuals are 
among the main reasons why most UN public goods regimes do not effectively protect the common 
self-interests of citizens. UN agreements focusing on dispute settlement procedures among states offer 
no effective protection of human rights, consumer welfare of citizens and access to justice inside 
countries. The lack of “cosmopolitan justice” also hinders producers, investors, traders and consumers 
to use and develop IEL for maximizing consumer welfare, transnational rule of law and protection of 
citizen rights more effectively. As long as national and international judges do not cooperate in 
protecting transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens, “intergovernmental governance” and 
inadequately regulated “private self-governance” of the worldwide division of labour remain 
characterized by numerous “market failures” and “governance failures” to the detriment of equal 
rights of citizens and their consumer welfare. 
The customary law requirement of settling disputes in conformity with “inalienable” and “indivisible” 
human rights and other “principles of justice” requires “balancing” of all civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights
96
 with due regard to the diverse “contexts of justice” such as: 
 the different contexts of the private, moral, legal, democratic and cosmopolitan freedoms of 
citizens protecting diverse ethical conceptions of a “good life” as well as moral, legal, 
democratic and cosmopolitan rights to equal respect and human rights;
97
 
 the utilitarian principles of economic efficiency underlying multilevel economic regulation, such 
as the legal ranking of trade policy instruments in GATT/WTO law according to their respective 
economic efficiency, or the commitment of EU law to a “highly competitive social market 
economy” within “an area of freedom, security and justice” (Article 3 TEU) among 27 EU 
member states;
98
 
 the sometimes one-sidedly libertarian focus on economic liberties and property rights in 
international investment law and adjudication as well as in some other fields of economic and 
commercial law and arbitration (e.g., on intellectual property protection);
99
 
 the legal prioritization of human and constitutional rights over utilitarian “common goods” in 
democratic constitutions and human rights instruments, based on “discourse justifications” of 
human rights and “principles of justice” (e.g., recognizing social discourse as reasonable only to 
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the extent that the discourse partners implicitly and autonomously recognize each other as free 
and equal participants in their discursive search for truth);
100
 whereas John Locke invoked God 
for justifying human rights, constitutional democracies, European and UN human rights law 
derive “inalienable human rights” from respect for human autonomy and reasonableness, 
including a right “to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be fully realized” (Article 28 UDHR);101 
 even though the universal recognition of human rights (e.g., in UN law) as constitutional 
foundation of all governance powers confirms the legal priority of equal human freedoms (as 
defined by human rights) as integral part of positive, national and international legal systems in 
the 21st century, most human rights guarantees remain subject to communitarian restrictions in 
order to protect public goods; yet, in contrast to English conceptions of parliamentary 
sovereignty and American conceptions of civil and political human and constitutional rights as 
“trumping” in case of conflicts with democratic majority legislation, European courts 
acknowledge that legislative and administrative restrictions of human rights require “balancing” 
of competing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in order to establish whether 
governmental restrictions are suitable, necessary and proportionate means for reconciling 
competing human or constitutional rights in reasonable procedures.
102
 
VII. Conclusion: Human Rights and Justice Require Cosmopolitan Conceptions of 
Transnational “Aggregate Public Goods” 
Republicanism, constitutionalism and human rights argue in different, yet complementary ways for 
empowering citizens to assume control of the limited powers delegated to multilevel governance 
institutions so as to exercise democratic responsibility for their common property of public goods (res 
publica). As individuals are born into families, grow up in social communities, and their individual 
control over the forces governing individual lives is diminishing with “globalization,” liberal 
conceptions of individuals as “freely choosing, unencumbered selves” are criticized from 
communitarian perspectives.
103
 For instance, the “burdens of judgment” prompted Rawls—in his 
Political Liberalism—to limit his Kantian interpretation of the “first principle of justice” by re-
interpreting the demanding “Kantian moral imperative” in terms of procedural “discourse justice” in a 
hypothetical “original position” of reasonable human beings agreeing on equal basic freedoms (rather 
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than maximum equal freedoms) as “first principle of justice.”104 Also individual consent to “social 
contracts” and agreements—even if reflecting ideals of autonomy and reciprocity—does not prove the 
fairness of contracts if their conclusion was due to unequal bargaining power and information 
asymmetries. As all liberal “autonomy rights” need to be determined and justified on general and 
reciprocal reasons through social discourse in private, political and legal communities, liberal and 
communitarian conceptions of justice must be reconciled through social and democratic discourse.
105
 
The moral and legal “human rights imperative” of treating all persons as ends of humanity and as 
autonomous, reasonable “principals” of governments can be reconciled with very diverse conceptions 
of democratic self-governance, communitarian supply of public goods and republican conceptions of 
common ownership of public goods (res publica). Yet, this contribution has argued that—beyond 
legitimately diverse constitutional democracies—democratic representation in international 
organizations and parliamentary control of the law and practices of worldwide organizations remain 
inevitably weak. Hence, the deficit in representative democracy in the multilevel governance of global 
public goods must be compensated by participatory, deliberative and “cosmopolitan democracy” based 
on cosmopolitan rights and corresponding legal and judicial accountability of multilevel governance of 
international public goods. In the 21st century, denial by governments of their legal and judicial 
accountability vis-à-vis citizens for the often arbitrary violations of international law and for their 
under-supply of other international public goods can no longer be justified in terms of reasonable self-
interests of citizens. 
A. Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism 
The individual and social identity of most people depends on their mutual recognition and respect as 
members of social, political and legal communities.
106
 Similar to the transformation of authoritarian 
into democratic national legal systems resulting from “struggles for human rights,” the recognition of 
citizens as legal subjects in ever more fields of international law—like international labour law, HRL 
and IEL—often resulted from “struggles for justice” beyond nation states, for instance by trade unions 
following World War I and in the context of European integration and decolonization following World 
War II. The “emancipatory functions” of cosmopolitan rights are to protect individual autonomy and 
responsibility by empowering people in their mutually beneficial cooperation across state borders, to 
set incentives for participatory and deliberative democracy beyond the state, to institutionalize “public 
reason,” to enhance “checks and balances” limiting abuses of power (e.g., by means of judicial 
remedies), and to better protect public goods (like transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens). 
Recognition of citizens as subjects of international law—e.g., in terms of membership of 
representatives of employers and workers in ILO bodies, or “EU citizenship” as defined in Articles 
20–23 TFEU—often goes far beyond liberty rights. For instance, European HRL and integration law 
have limited libertarian claims of “self-ownership” of one’s body if such claims neglect human dignity 
and other human rights limitations of market freedoms (e.g., labour rights). Also libertarian opposition 
to redistribution of “market outcomes” based on “justice in holdings” and “justice in transfers” (Robert 
Nozick) has not prevented the “social market economies” in Europe from adopting ever more 
comprehensive EU social regulations protecting disadvantaged people (e.g., foreign workers and their 
families in EU member states). The social pressures for governmental supply and protection of “public 
goods” satisfying the unlimited demand of citizens for scarce goods, services and other resources 
increasingly prompt democracies to liberalize international trade and investments and design IEL in 
conformity with utilitarian and libertarian principles of economic efficiency, market competition and 
protection of property rights. Yet, this instrumental “economic rationality” of modern IEL has not 
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prevented international legal limitations of “utilitarian efficiency” whenever utilitarian conceptions of 
IEL neglect human rights (e.g., by abusing child work and gender discrimination as means for the 
happiness of others), ignore general consumer welfare (e.g., by one-sidedly prioritizing “producer 
welfare”), or neglect the legitimacy of economically inefficient, social contestation (e.g., labour 
strikes, social protests) and the need for respecting reasonable “constitutional pluralism.” 
Arguably, constitutional and cosmopolitan rights to private and democratic self-governance as well as 
to “access to justice” through judicial review of governmental restrictions of individual freedoms are 
necessary not only for protecting civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights with due 
respect for their often different protection in different jurisdictions with diverse constitutional 
traditions and democratic preferences. As explained by the Kantian theory of cosmopolitan multilevel 
constitutionalism,
107
 the moral arguments for “principles of justice” protecting maximum equal 
cosmopolitan liberties of citizens apply also to mutually beneficial, transnational cooperation among 
citizens in the global division of labour and collective supply of international public goods. Kant’s 
proposals for multilevel, constitutional protection of cosmopolitan freedoms were based on Kant’s 
categorical imperative of maximizing equal freedoms as a universal law by treating persons as legal 
subjects rather than mere objects. Kant argued that the ever more precise, legal clarification of equal 
freedoms and cosmopolitan rights and remedies would not only promote mutually beneficial trade, but 
contribute also to limiting the “unsocial sociability” of rational egoists by institutionalizing “public 
peace.” Similarly, Rawls has argued that institutionalizing “public reason” limiting human rivalry and 
protecting rule of law in social cooperation requires a “four-stage sequence” of constitutional, 
legislative, executive and judicial rule-making and institutions protecting an “overlapping consensus” 
on “principles of justice” and rule of law among citizens and governments with often conflicting value 
preferences and self-interests.
108
 Empirical evidence confirms that rights-based international public 
goods regimes—like the common market law of the EU and EEA—have protected not only rights of 
citizens and their consumer welfare through mutually beneficial economic cooperation across 
frontiers; the multilevel judicial protection of transnational rule of law has also transformed the 
European economic integration treaties into the most effective peace treaties in European history. As 
an instrument of promoting economic welfare and human autonomy rights, rights-based IEL has 
proven to be more effective than the prevailing “Hobbesian conceptions” of “international law among 
states” denying citizens individual rights to invoke, e.g., liberal trade rules in domestic courts in order 
to protect transnational rule of law for the benefit of producers, traders, investors and consumers. The 
free movement of persons and “EU citizenship rights” inside the EU illustrate that protection of 
cosmopolitan rights can broaden and enrich, rather than undermine communitarian conceptions of a 
just and diverse society and of a good life embedded into social solidarity. 
Hence, many advocates of human and cosmopolitan rights argue that, in contrast to Rawls’s refusal to 
extend his principles of justice for a constitutional democracy beyond the state to an international Law 
of Peoples,
109
 neither “Rawlsian tolerance” vis-à-vis non-liberal but “decent people” and states, nor the 
individual and democratic responsibilities of citizens for their own, individual and social welfare 
justify neglecting transnational human and cosmopolitan rights and obligations in IEL. As illustrated 
by the unnecessary poverty of so many people in less-developed countries, the prevailing 
“Westphalian conceptions” of “international law among sovereign states” fail to protect citizens 
against widespread abuses of foreign policy powers and undersupply of international public goods. 
Diplomatic insistence on “member-driven governance” (e.g., in the Bretton Woods institutions, GATT 
and the WTO) reflects pre-democratic Hobbesian claims that, once the people have conferred powers 
to the rulers, citizens have surrendered their authority rather than remaining “democratic principals” 
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and holders of “inalienable rights” to individual and democratic self-government under the rule of law. 
The more globalization transforms national constitutions into “partial constitutions” that cannot 
unilaterally protect transnational “aggregate public goods” in a globally integrated world (like 
mutually beneficial, international monetary, trade, financial, environmental and rule of law systems 
composed of national public goods), the more do citizen welfare and effective protection of economic 
rights within and beyond state borders require “cosmopolitan constitutionalism” based on human 
rights, democratic self-governance and transnational rule of law rather than only on state consent.
110
 
As already universally acknowledged in Article 28 of the UDHR (1948), stronger protection of the 
economic welfare and human rights of billions of citizens in today’s globally integrated world 
economy depends on whether IEL will succeed in regulating the “collective action problems” of a 
mutually beneficial world trading, financial, environment and development system more effectively 
for the benefit of citizens and their cosmopolitan rights. Republicanism, constitutionalism and human 
rights argue for limiting the ubiquity of governance failures and market failures in international 
economic relations by stronger legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights embedding 
“cosmopolitan states” into international law and multilevel institutions protecting transnational public 
goods. 
B. Public Goods Regimes Must Be Embedded into “Multilevel Constitutionalism” Constituting, 
Limiting, Regulating and Justifying Multilevel Governance of Public Goods 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice explains why “the fact that in a democratic regime political power is 
regarded as the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body” requires that the democratic 
exercise of coercive power over one another can be recognized as being democratically legitimate only 
when “political power [ . . . ] is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the 
essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common 
human reason.”111 In contrast to majoritarian democracies focusing on “freedom of parliament” rather 
than on constitutional rights of citizens, constitutional democracies share the common experience 
(e.g., in the United States) that protecting constitutional rights vis-à-vis abuses of public and private 
power requires constitutional, legislative, administrative and judicial protection of fundamental rights 
and other “principles of justice.” From the point of view of citizens and their cosmopolitan rights, 
“constitutional safeguards” are no less necessary vis-à-vis the ever more governance powers 
transferred to international organizations for the collective supply of international public goods. 
International agreements constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying international institutions for 
mutually beneficial governance of interrelated, national and international public goods (like efficient 
monetary, trading, financial and related rule-of-law systems) aim at limiting national governance 
failures and can serve “constitutional functions” for protecting producers, investors, traders, 
consumers and other citizens engaged in mutually beneficial cooperation across frontiers against 
welfare-reducing border discrimination and other harmful abuses of discretionary foreign policy 
powers.
112
 But the increasing transformation of national into international public goods with 
“horizontal” as well as “vertical interdependencies” (e.g., among national and international markets 
for goods, services, persons and capital movements) also entails new private and public powers (e.g., 
of private actors in global financial markets, international organizations) that risk being abused in the 
absence of adequate constitutional and democratic restraints, as illustrated by the under-regulation of 
international financial markets ushering in the private and public debt crises since 2008. This 
increasing gap between the “law in the books” and the “law in action” rightly prompts “new legal 
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realist scholars” to call for multidisciplinary analyses of the “new legal world” and legal problems 
caused by globalization and by its increasing connection of national and international legal regimes.
113
 
Arguably, the less national parliaments, courts and citizens control intergovernmental rule-making in 
distant international organizations and the more rent-seeking interest groups “capture” transnational 
economic regulation (e.g., the EU banana and the US cotton policies), the more must the deficit in 
parliamentary and deliberative democracy be compensated by rights-based constitutionalism and 
multilevel judicial protection of constitutional rights and “participatory democracy” across frontiers. 
As explained by Rawls, “in a constitutional regime with judicial review, public reason is the reason of 
its supreme court;
114
 transparent, rules-based and impartial judicial reasoning, subject to procedural 
guarantees of due process of law, makes independent courts less politicized “fora of principle” than 
political institutions dominated by interest-group politics; principle-oriented judicial reasoning is also 
of constitutional importance for an “overlapping, constitutional consensus” necessary for legally stable 
and just relations among free, equal and rational citizens who tend to remain deeply divided by 
conflicting moral, religious and philosophical doctrines. In Europe, the EU Courts, the European Court 
of Human Rights, the EFTA Court and national courts have interpreted the international EC, EU, EEA 
treaties and the ECHR as constitutional orders founded on respect for human rights. Multilevel judicial 
protection of cosmopolitan rights (such as human rights, trading rights, investor rights, intellectual 
property rights) can promote incremental “judicial constitutionalization” also of other international 
trade, investment and environmental treaty regimes for the benefit of citizens. Yet, in view of the 
“constitutional prioritization” of civil and political rights over economic and social rights of citizens in 
many countries outside Europe, multilevel judicial protection of economic and social rights remains 
contested. As explained by Immanuel Kant’s theory of multilevel constitutional guarantees of equal 
freedoms (as “first principle of justice”) in all human interactions at national, transnational and 
international levels, multilevel constitutionalism is neither based on naïve assumptions about 
individuals’ moral capacities nor on utopian calls for a “global Constitution”; it is necessary for 
protecting “public reason” against abuses of power in transnational relations with due respect for the 
legitimate reality of “constitutional pluralism” so that—even in a “society of devils” (Immanuel 
Kant)—human interactions remain constitutionally restrained.115 The diverse forms of multilevel 
constitutionalism in the EU, the EEA and the ECHR, like the multilevel judicial protection of 
cosmopolitan rights in international commercial, trade, investment, regional integration and human 
rights law outside Europe, illustrate that “multilevel constitutionalism” has become a politically 
feasible and realistic conception of “constitutional justice” protecting individual freedom to decide 
how an individual wishes to prioritize civil, political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of 
personal autonomy in order to “live well” with due respect for the ethical responsibility not only of 
oneself, but also of other people.
116
 Arguably, the legitimacy of “cosmopolitan IEL” and of “multilevel 
constitutional restraints” of “intergovernmentalism” and international organizations derives from 
protecting human rights, other “principles of justice” and national democracies’ promise of self-
governance of citizens within the limits of rule of law. 
                                                     
113
 See Stewart Macaulay, The New versus the Old Legal Realism: Things Ain’t What They Used to Be, Wisconsin Law 
Review 365 (2005); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 Cornell Law Review 61 (2009). On the need for “sociological jurisprudence,” see 
already Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 American Law Review 12 (1910), at 15. 
114
 See Rawls, supra note 104, at 231 et seq. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism (2004) claims, by contrast, that there is little evidence why people should put more trust in highest 
courts as guardians of the constitution than in legislators. 
115
 On Kantian “multilevel constitutionalism” and its justification of multilevel constitutional safeguards of equal liberty 
rights, see PETERSMANN, supra note 1, chapter III. 
116
 See DWORKIN, supra note 86, at 419: “The two ethical ideals—living well and having a good life—are different.” 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
48 
C. International Public Goods Regimes and Reasonable Disagreement 
From the perspective of democratic discourse treating citizens as free and equal, national and 
international public goods regimes may be perceived as structured forms of agreed law creation 
requiring legal and judicial protection of equal freedoms.
117
 Globalization interconnects national and 
international legal regimes and promotes both “centrifugal legal reforms” (e.g., by legal empowerment 
of nonstate actors creating special legal regimes) as well as “legal integration” (e.g., due to universal 
human rights obligations and universal membership in the UN, UN Specialized Agencies and 
increasingly also the WTO). The coexistence of non-hierarchical, transnational legal orders and the 
increasing civil society claims for cosmopolitan rights protecting individual and democratic self-
government beyond state borders give rise to a new “global legal pluralism” challenging state-centred 
conceptions of international law. For instance, the citizen-driven structures of IEL argue for 
interpreting human rights and related principles of democracy and subsidiarity in favour of stronger 
protection of cosmopolitan rights, non-discriminatory conditions of competition and transnational rule 
of law for the benefit of citizens rather than in favour of “Westphalian presumptions” of state 
sovereignty to withhold state consent to collective protection of internationally recognized public 
goods necessary for protecting human rights and “sustainable development.”118 
Reasonable citizens with legitimately diverse conceptions for a good life and “social justice” often 
reasonably disagree among themselves on how distributive justice, corrective justice, commutative 
justice or “equity” and “transitional justice” should be realized in economic regulation inside “well-
ordered societies” as well as in transnational, power-oriented relations. Even though philosophical 
reflection on the nature of law, justice and “governance by law” is as old as philosophy itself, neither 
legal practitioners nor academics agree on a single theory and methodology of international law and 
IEL. This reality of “methodological pluralism,” just as cosmopolitan conceptions of IEL and rights-
based conceptions of democracy, are likely to remain contested, for instance by proponents of 
majoritarian democracy and of “rational choice” theories prioritizing pursuit of rational self-interests 
over “reasonable” regard to, and “balancing” of, cosmopolitan interests. Reasonable disagreement 
over legal protection of international public goods is likely to remain a permanent fact of life that 
tends to be respected in most treaties explicitly (e.g., in their “public interest clauses” reserving 
sovereign rights to protect national public goods) or implicitly (e.g., as being implied in the customary 
requirement of interpreting treaties “in conformity with principles of justice” and human rights). Also 
at national levels of legal regulation, some societies will continue defining democracy in terms of 
“parliamentary sovereignty” (as in England) or prioritize civil and political constitutional rights over 
economic and social “common law freedoms” (as in the United States); other societies are likely to 
continue prioritizing economic and social rights (as in China) or, as in Germany, prioritize “individual 
sovereignty” through constitutional protection of “maximum equal liberties” (including “positive 
liberties” and welfare rights) in view of the historical experience of Germany’s Weimar Republic that 
parliamentary powers may be usurped and abused by dictatorial regimes. In view of the legitimate 
reality of “constitutional pluralism” as well as of “methodological pluralism” in public goods research, 
legal scholarship should reveal its normative preconceptions and acknowledge the need for respecting 
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legitimate “constitutional pluralism” rather than pretend to have found “the one and only right answer 
to a legal problem.”119 
In contrast to the claims by the German philosophers Hegel and Marx, neither the nation state nor 
communist ideology has brought about “the end of history.” All UN member states have committed 
themselves to the need to protect global public goods. Yet, UN law and policies continue to be 
dominated by “Westphalian conceptions” of “international law among sovereign states” that obviously 
fail to protect global public goods effectively—like an efficient world trading and financial system, 
prevention of greenhouse gas emissions, poverty reduction and universal fulfilment of human rights. 
Globalization transforms national constitutions into “partial constitutions” that cannot unilaterally 
protect “aggregate public goods” across national borders without stronger respect for international 
law. The less “constitutional nationalism” and “Westphalian intergovernmentalism” succeed in 
realizing their declared policy goals, the more it becomes necessary to acknowledge the need for 
multilevel constitutionalism based on respect for the reality of “constitutional pluralism” and 
“methodological pluralism” in multilevel, legal limitations of “market failures” as well as “governance 
failures.” The increasing interactions among national and international legal regimes require judges to 
settle disputes, promote mutual coherence and protect legal security on the basis of common 
constitutional principles. Rather than pretending that textual, contextual and functional interpretation 
of economic rules may lead to “objectively true” judgments, IEL scholarship and adjudication should 
respect reasonable disagreement in view of the fact that cosmopolitan moral and legal principles for 
relations among individuals, like moral and legal principles for international relations among states, 
are not governed by objectively existing “natural morons” (Ronald Dworkin); hence, the value 
premises, preconceptions and methodological choices underlying public goods research should be 
explicitly revealed and justified in the light of “public reason.” Contrary to pretentious claims that 
“doctrinal legal research is dead” and “black letter legal research” should be buried, legal 
methodology and doctrinal legal research need to be “revitalized” in order to resist the increasing 
“instrumentalization of law” for the benefit of powerful interest groups and the degeneration of 
international legal research into “case law journalism” (Pierre Schlag).120 Conceptualizing 
international public goods regimes as “integration law” aimed at integrating private and public, 
national and international regulation for the benefit of citizens, their human rights and legitimate 
demands for protecting “global public goods” through stronger cosmopolitan rights is a doctrinal 
perspective that has hardly begun being explored by self-proclaimed “realist lawyers,” political 
scientists and economists. 
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